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There is a close relationsF  ip between the means of financing the
fiscal deficit and macroeconomic outcomes in Colombia.  A
debt-financed  deficit  increase  of about I percent  ofGDP translates
into a real interest rate increase of 3 to 5 percent; a money-
financed deficit increase of about I percent translates into 15
percentage points more inflation.
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Colombia is justly celebrated in Latin America  and fundamental policy changes, especially the
for its prudent macroeconomic management, the  latter. To restore long-tenn growth, some fiscal
cornerstone of which is careful management of  reform will be needed to reverse some measure
fiscal deficits.  implemented between 1985 and 1989.
From the 1960s through the early 1970s,  Easterly finds a close relationship between
Colombia's macroeconomic policy was mostly  the means of financing the fiscal deficit and
conservative - supportive of an export-oriented  macroeconomic outcomes in Colombia.  Using a
development strategy associated with high  simulation model, he traces how money-financed
growth of both GDP and trade.  Authorities were  and domestic debt-financed fiscal deficits
partially successful at steril;  n'g a surge in  translate into inflation and the real interest rate.
coffee export revenues in the second half of the
1970s. In the early 1980s, the end of the coffee  Roughly speaking, a debt-financed deficit
boom coincided with a large increase in public  increase of about 1 percent of GDP translates
investment - especially in energy - which led  into a real interest rate increase of 3 to 5 percent;
to an incipient balance of payments and debt  a money-financed deficit increase ol about I
crisis.  This crisis was largely avoided through a  percent translates into 15 percentage points more
strong, continuing adjustment effort that began  inflation.
in 1985.
Easterly finds that many changes in the real
Episodes of loose fiscal policy in Colombia  exchange rate between 1975 and 1987 are
have been minor compared with other Latin  attributable to fiscal policy.  He shows how
American countries. The crisis of the early  external debt financing and domestic debt
1980s was cut short by a sharp fiscal adjustment.  financing have relatively different effects on the
This adjustment was a combination of good luck  real exchange rate and the real interest rate.
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This paper analyzes the macroeconomic  effects of public sector
deficits  in  Cole -ia,  using  the  methodology  set  out in the  research  proposal.'
The first section  will review  the historical  evolution  of fiscal  policy  in
Colombia,  with  an  emphasis  on  the  adjustment  program  of  1985-89.  Since  the  fiscal
deficit  is  particularly  sensitive  to  developments  in  the  coffee  sector,  a  section
looks  at  how  much  of  the  public  coffee  balance  is  explained  by  exogenous  shocks.
The  next  section  examines  how  fisca'  deficits  affect  the  inflation  rate  and  the
real  interest  rate,  using  an econometrically-estimated  model  of the  money  and
credit  markets.  The following  section  discusses  the relationship  between  the
fiscal  deficit  and  the  real  exchange  rate,  using  a reduced  form  model  of  traded
and nontraded  goods.  The concluding  section  puts together  the  models  of the
preceding  sections  to  look  at  the  simultaneous  determination  of  the  real  exchange
rate  and  the  real  interest  rate  in  response  to fiscal  policy  changes.
II.  HISTORICAL  BACKGROUND
Colombia is justly celebrated  in Latin America for its prudent
macroeconomic  management,  of  which  careful  management  of fiscal  deficits  is  the
cornerstone. Even the  occasional  departures  from  conservative  macroeconomic
policy  seem  tame  by Latin  American  standards.  We  will  review  the  broad  outlines
of  macroeconomic  policy  in  this  section. In  the  following  section,  we  will  look
in  more detail  into  the  adjustment  that  has  taken  place  since  1985.
'Easterly,  W.,  K. Schmidt-Hebbel,  and  C.  Rodriguez, The  Hacroeconomics  of
Public  Sector  Deficits',  March  1989.2
1.  Macroeconomic  Management.  1960-89
A very  brief  synopsis  of Colombian  macroeconomic  policy  will  help to
introduce  t.±is  section  (see  Garcia  %1988)  for  a  more  detailed  review).  Table
1 shows  some basic  macroeconomic  indicators.  From rhe  mid 1960's  through  the
early 1970's,  macroeconomic  policy  was mostly  conservative,  supportive  of an
export-oriented  development  strategy  that  was  associated  with  high  growth  of  both
'DP  and  trade. The  main factor  in  the  second  half  of the  1970's  was the  surge
in coffee  export  revenues,  which  the authorities  were partially  successful  at
sterilizing. In the  early  1980's  the  end  of the  coffee  boom coincided  with a
large  increase  in  public  investment--especially  in  the  energy  sector--which  led
to an incipient  balance  of payments  and  debt crisis. The crisis  was largely
avoided  thanks  to  a strong  adjustment  effort  beginning  in  1985  and  continuing  to
the  preient.
Figure  1  presents  a  historical  perspective  on  fiscal  management.  The
only series  available  for  a sufficiently  long  period  is the  IFS series  on the
national  government  deficit,  which  is  not  consistent  with the  fiscal  data  used
elsewhere  in  this  report  but  does  show  a  similar  pattern.  We see  there  have  been
3  episodes  of loose  fiscal  policy  at roughly  ten-year  intervals--in  1961-62,  in
1972-73,  and 1981-84,  of which the last  is by far the  most severe. Each  was
followed  by rapid fiscal  adjustment  that avoided a prolonged  crisis.  The
impression  of  careful  macroeconomic  management  over  a long  period  is  confirmed.
The impression  of  relative  macro stability  is confirmed by the
behavior  of the inflation  rate, as shown in figure  2.  By Latin American
standards  (although  not by world standards)  the rate is vary stable,  staying
within  a  band  of  roughly  15  to  35  percent  since  the  early  1970'8.  We see  roughly
3 distinct  periods.  (1)  During  most of the  1960's,  inflation  oscillated3
COLOAIA
Table  1:  Basic  Economic  Indicators
Five  Year  Avorageo
1060-66  1965-70  1970-75  1976-00  1980-86  1986-89
Real  Exchange Rate  /  99.78  112.79  129.85  128.26  118.46  161.40
Inflation  Rate  11.08  9.25  16.87  24.17  28.12  24.04
Fiscal  Boalanco/  GDP  2  -1.22  -0.49  -1.45  -0.08  -8.64  -1.82
Fiscal  Balance/  CDP  V/  -2.08  -6.80  -2.60
Fiscal  Balanco/  GOP  t/  -2.17  -1.77  -2.06  -1.68  -6.78
Real  Intnreot  Rate:
On  Loans  2.48  4.40  10.30  13.00
On  Doposits  -2.20  -1.00  4.81  6.06
GODP  Growth  4.71  6.99  6.68  6.85  2.25  8.50
Curr  Aect  B6lance/  CDP  -2.80  -2.70  -2.79  0.62  -6.07  -1.12
Res'  Priv  Inv/  Real  GOP  11.86  10.24  9.26  0.14  7.41  8.21
Pub  Ext  Debt/  CDP  8/  19.98  16.27  22.68  37.16
Pub  Ext  Debt/  XGS  !/  124.08  79.30  182.99 187.68
----------------------------------- _----,----------------------__------------_._-------------
Depreciation  Is  up.
International  Financial  Statistics  Yearbook  1989  (National  Covornment  only)'
data  until  1987  only.
3/ World  Bank  proj  ect.
J/  J.  Garcia-Garcia.  Qdacroeconouic  Policies,  Crisis  and  Growth  in  the  Long  Run:
Colombia  Country  Study.'  May  1988.
W/  World  Debt  Mable;  Public  external  debt  data  until  1966  only.Figure  1
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in response  to periodic  large  adjustments  of the  exchange  rate.  (2)  Following
the introduction  of the  crawling  peg in 1967,  the inflation  rate stayed  very
stable  for  about  5  years.  (3)  After  the  episode  of loose  fiscal  policy  in  1972-
73, inflation  accelerated. It otayed  over 20 percent  after  the coffee  boom
resulted  in some  monetization  of reserve  inflows. After  the  end  of the  coffee
boom, the fiscal expansion  replaced  reserve inflows  as a  source of money
creation.  Subsequent  fiscal contraction  was just sufficient  to match the
reduction  in external  credit  availability  during  the  debt crisis,  so that  the
need for  money  creation  continued.
Figure  3  shows  the  evolution  of  money  creation,  roughly  defined  as  the
change  in  base  money  over  GDP. We see  that  the  reliance  on seignorage  has  been
remarkably  stable  since  the mid-60's,  aside from a burst of money creation
associated  with the  coffee  boom in  the  late  1970's.
The behavior  of the real exchange  rate mirrors changes in macro
policies,  as shown  in figure  4.  The exchange  rate  was quite  volatile  in the
early  60's,  but after  the introduction  of the  crawling  peg it shows  a steady
depreciation  (depreciation  is  up).  This  was reversed  by the  coffee  boom  after
1975,  after  which  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciated  steadily  until  the  early
1980's. During  the  adjustment  effort  beginning  in  1985,  the  real  exchange  rate
once again depreciated  substantially. We see some association  between the
behavior  of the  real  exchange  rate  and the  episodes  of fiscal  contraction  and
expansion.  The  greatest  appreciation  of the  currency  came  duJ:ing  the  periods  of
expansionary  fiscal  policy  in the  early  60's and  early  80's.  The episode  of
loose  fiscal  policy  during  the  early  70's,  on the  other  hand,  did  not seem  to
have much effect.  We will examine  in a subsequent  section  the relationship
between  deficits  and  the  real  exchange  rate.Figure  3
COLOMBIA:
Seignorage  1960-88




















60  62  64  66  68  70  72  74  76  78  80  82  84  86  88
Year
Real Exchange Rate*
S  deviation trom 1975 value.9
The real  interest  rate  shows  a  more erratic  path than inflation  and
the real  exchange  rate,  as shown  in figure  5.  This teflects  the controls  on
interest rates prior to 1974, after which began a  process of  financial
liberalization  in fits and starts.  Interest  rates  have been mostly  market-
determined  during  the  1980's,  with  occasional  temporary  controls  such  as those
Imposed  in 1988.  The  iscal  expansion  of the  1980's  was -'ssociated  with some
rise in the  real interest  rate,  although  the  interest  rate  remained  high  even
after  the  fiscal  adjustment.
A puzzle of macroeconomic  behavior  in Colombia is the long-term
decline  in  the  private  investment  ratio,  as  shown  in  figure  6.  This  is  defined
in real terms  to avoid  any relative  price  effect. As seen  in the  graph,  the
fiscal  adjustment  of the  first  half  of the  80's  was  associated  with  a  decline  in
investment,  while  the  adju.tment  program  of  1985-88  was  associated  with  a rebound
of private investment.  The fall in the later 19709 and early 1980s was
associated  with  high  real  interest  rates  (rigure  5)  and  a  high  relative  price  of
capital  3oods  (figure  7).  But  this  was  modest  compared  to the  secular  decline
in  investment.  The  reasons  for  this  may  not  be  macroeconomic  ones; the  long-run
increase  in political  and drug-related  violence  could  be another  explanation
(although  violence  was  also  endemic  in  the  1950's).  This  study  will address  the
behavior  of investment  in  the  short  run,  but  will  not address  fully  the  causes
of the  secular  decline.Figure  5
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Tabg  2:  fiml  Aw  Summ,  7118-47
(A,  5  of  SP  - currieS  _eie)
191  3196  1i9  191  1t9  10  19"  19  U  5  1l  1964  196  196  19
T79  mmme  6.10  M.7  94.91  9.56  4.14.  97.5  24.78  1.04  5.15  ".219  1.95  W4.1  U.04
oar_eow  R..emo  5.48  5.11  5.9  .90  U.=  94.61  1.7  n.u  94.77  9.0  o7.8  89.5  99.
Taves  11.67  14.0n  18.56  18.95  18.41  14.74  12.9  11.9  18.11  18.07  18.69  14.94  14.60
omtoa  41.91  4.41  5.48  4.41  5.5  5.n  4.10  6.11  4.f6  9.10  9.90  13.1U  9.93
05.e.  4.5  4.0  5.00  4.5  8.0  4.6  4.16  4.47  6.61  4.78  4.26  4.39  4.77
Capitl  m.n..  0.o7  0.61  0.27  0.86  0.67  9.25  2.94  9.96  1.06  2.86  2.57  1.70  1.68
Total  Ebpamitua,  1.oc  04.60  25.90  4.67  .U  30.94  81.19  81.77  85.56  85.  34.84  84.78  82.66
ciArrot  iedlbari  ,  16s  I.5  15.71  18.41  90.64  19.16  90.8  19.5161  1."  0.05  n.20  11.96  23.56  s2.71
Wages  A  SlaIsm,  7.00  6.49  6.17  6.85  6.5  5.1  5.45  6.41  6.a  2.00  8.00  4.oD  4.n
a4.d  & Sawimc  1.71  2.12  1.44  2.291  1.  2.19  1.06  2.66  1.  1.16  2.19  2.04  1.95
IM.r..t  PM  to  1.00  1.16  1.15  1.9  .8U  1.66  1.5  2.00  2.8  3.40  S.84  8.71  4.55
O0_mme  0.81  0.47  0.86  0.56  0.5t  0.  0.50  0.5  0.46  1.51  1.9  0.9"  1.16
cEs.eI  O."  0.65  0.76  o.6  0.78  1.5  1.11  1.48  1.65  2.95  1.96  2.78  3.87
c>eit  T  Xmmlr.  7.75  5.56  7.94  9.78  7.48  10.56  6.856  .15  7.04  9.41  6.64  9.04  9.10
OUw  buit.r..  1.95  0.40  1.29  1.82  1.  0.48  1.66  0.47  2.56  6.48  9.51  4.22  2.60
Cawgmi  ExpeeAiture  6.80  9.01  7.44  8.1  9.M  0.71  11.80  U.4  11.56  12.40  12.69  11.95  10.60
arose  Plid  CwIt*l  5.84  6.86  4.90  4.5  7.01  6.94  7.6  7.94  7.07  6.6  6.70  7.91  7.27
Caitul  T*mf  re  1.48  9.04  2.04  -1.05  1.96  1.56  1.67  . 1A  1.86  9.81  2.56  2.19  2.60
OVw  CmlSuU  Pmo.sm  0.5  0.6  0.46  0.49  0.56  0.7  0.95  O."  2  9.06  1.90  1.48  O."  O."9
Not  Lieieg  0.90  0.95  0.95  0.95  0.15  0.05  0.14  0.10  0.90  0.47  0.u1  0.85  0.17
Tot  0lkIp(-)  l  6w1  -2.66  -1.09  -1.52  0..  -4.61  -1.5  -4.45  -7.01  -7.44  4.87  -4.52  -1.96  -2.t0
Odr  W  Ifel (-)/  Surplus  4.417  7.85  B.8  4.86  8.99  4.1. 1  2.96  9.5  9.27  2.79  5.41  &.67  6.49
Totl  i_wmensis  1.96  1.09  1.5  -o."  4.61  1.46  6.45  7.01  7.44  6.87  4.2  1.26  2.50
949.  Pl...i.  -4.0  . 0.77  0.18  1.41  O.56  1.90  1.5  4.10  5.18  5.1U  1.54  0.41  1.6
1easi  u  inPmal"S  1.15  1.48  O."  1.95  2.40  1.9(  8.5  1.  1.09  2.49  2.9  4.61  0.20
Othe  *  1.66  -1.18  -0.09  -4.1  1.76  4.94  0.64  4.04  0.91  -1.94  0.X8  -8.99  0.40
ft.ihal  ofl  A"I  f1Am_ag  loom  We  eaW  u.14
2.  Public  Sector  Accounts,  1975-87
Table  2 shows  the  evolution  of the  consolidated  nonfinancial  public
sector  accounts  from 197S-87.2 The deficit  is under  control  except  for the
years  1981-84.  Deficits  were  small  during  the  heyday  of  the  coffee  boom  1975-78.
The  end  of  the  coffee  boom  brought  increased  deficits,  which  worsened  in  1981-84
because  of a surge  in  public  capital  spending. The  fiscal  adjustment  beginning
in  1985  took  place  through  a  reversal  of  the  increase  in  capital  expenditure  and
an increase  in  taxes. It  was  helped  by another  small  coffee  boom in  1986  that
increased  nontax  revenues.
We can get some idea  as to how the fiscal  crisis  of the  early  80's
developed  by separating  out  the  effects  of  changes  in  coffee  revenues  and  public
capital  spending,  the  two largest  single  influences  on the  deficit. Figure  8
shows  the  deficit  under  alternative  assumptions  about  the  behavior  of  the  coffee
surplus  and  public  investment. If  we hold  public  capital  spending  constant  at
its  1975  value  (with  the  coffee  sarplus  still  taking  its  actual  values),  we see
that  no fiscal  problem  would  have  developed.  On  the  contrary,  the  deficit  would
have remained  relatively  constant  until 1982,  then steadily  declined  until  a
large  surplus  was  registered  by  1987. This  suggests  that  expanded  public  capital
spending  played  a large  role  in  the  appeararce  of fiscal  imbalances  in  the  early
80's.  It also implies  that adjustment  in other  items in the fiscal  balance
besides  capital  spending  played  an important  role  in the  adjustment  program  of
1985-89.  We  will  examine  this  in  more  detail  below. The  other  line  in  the  graph
shows  what  would  have  happened  if the  coffee  surplus  had remained  the same  as
2The  figures  shown  here  are  somewhat  different  from  the  usual  numbers  on  the
public  sector  in Colombia  (including  Table  3) because  of a  more comprehensive
treatment  of local  government  finances.Figure  8
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in  1975.  in  addition  to  public  capital  staying  constant.  We see  that  the  deficit
would  have been significantly  larger  in the 1970's,  implying  that some fiscal
problems  were hidden  by the good fortune  of the coffee  bonanza.  The sharp
improvement  in 1986  is also  shown  to  have  depended  largely  on  coffee.
We can get some  more insight  into  the  behavior  of the  public  sector
over  time  by looking  at the  behavior  of  public  expenditure,  shown  in  Figure  9.
We  notice first of all a  tendency  toward increasing  size of the public
sector,which  was  only  mildly  reversed  during  the  adjustment  after  1984. We see
again  the  strong  role  of increasing  public  fixed  investment  in  both  the  rise  and
the  fall  of  public  spending  before  and  after  1984. The  other  notable  development
in the  rapid  increase  in  interest  payments,  reflecting  the  consequences  of  past
domestic  and foreign  borrowing  as well as the rise in foreign  and domestic
interest  rates. The  wage component  of  public  spending  is  more stable,  except
after  1983  when wage  compression  played  a role  in  the  fall  in spending. 3
The  increase  in  deficits  in  the  early  1980's  was financed  mostly  from
domestic  sources,  although  external  borrowing  also increased.  As figure  10
shows,  the  expansionary  fiscal  policy  did  result  in  a  rapid  growth  of the  public
debt  ratio  in  the  80's.  which  helps  to  explain  the  incipient  external  debt  crisis
of 1983-84. But  the  debt  accumulation  was from  a relatively  low  base  compared
to  most  other  Latin  American  countries,  so  that  the  fiscal  adjustment  of  1985-89
was enough  to avoid  a full-blown  debt  crisis. The restrained  use of external
financing  of the  public  sector  in  earlier  periods  helps  to explain  Colombia's
avoidance  of the  kind of debt  crisis  that  bedeviled  her  neighbors.
3The  decrease  in  the  wage  bill  in  1984  is  probably  an accounting  artifact,
since  there  is an offsetting  increase  in  current  transfers. However,  the  data
show  wage compression  in later  years,  as  we will see  in  the  next  section.Figure  9
COLOMBIA:  Consolidated  Non-Financial
Public  Sector Expenditure,  1975-87
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It helped  also that Colombia's  fiscal  expansion  during  1981-84  was
comparatively  modest. Unlike  Mexico  and  Argentina,  the  current  balance  of the
public  sector  always  showed  a  surplus,  of  over  2  percent  of  GDP. As  we  will see
below,  some  of the expansion  in public  investment  was in oil exploration  and
development,  which  paid  off  with  a surge  in  oil  exports  after  1985.
3.  The  adtustment  program  of 1985-89
As noted  earlier,  the  Colombian  government  began  a major  adjustment
program  in late  1984,  which  succeeded  in  eliminating  the  fiscal  imbalance  that
had threatened  to cause a macroeconomic  crisis.  Because of  the greater
availability  of data and the intrinsic  interest  of the issues  raised,  it is
worthwhile  to  examine  this  adjustment  in  somewhat  more  detail.
Table  3 shows  the  fiscal  accounts  for  this  period  in  more  detail  than
the preceding table 2.'  It is useful to distinguish  two main phases of
adjustment. In the  initial  phase  the  overall  deficit  was sharply  reduced  over
the  period  from  6.3  percent  of GDP in 1984  to only 0.3  percent  in 1986,  after
which  in the  second  phase  during  1987-89  it increased  again  to about  2  percent
of  GDP. 1986  was w special  year  because  of the  -urge  in  coffee  export  revenues,
a good  deal  of  wh,.h  accrued  to  the  public  sector.
Domestic  financing  of the deficit  in the first  phase was sharply
reduced,  from  nearly  5 percent  of GDP in 1984  to -2.7  percent  in 1986.  after
which  it increase  again  to  between  1 and  2  percent  of GDP.  It is  notable  that
net  external  financing  continued  to be available  diring  the  first  phase  of the
4As  noted  earlier,  this  data  has somewhat  different  coverage  than  Table  2
because  of a less comprehensive  treatment  of local government  finance and
different  accounting  conventions.20
Colobia
Table  8:  Non-financial  Consolidtted  public  sector,  1984-89
1984  1986  1.s  1907  1988  1989
(As  percent  of  GDP)
Total  revenue  19.28  21.04  28.88  22.16  22.18  22.20
Curront  rovenue  19.00  20.78  28.64  21.86  21.87  21.88
Tax  revenue  12.44  18.68  15.81  14.89  14.66  14.58
Nontax  revenue  6.89  7.61  9.60  7.44  7.68  8.81
Property  Income  0.98  1.27  1.00  0.98  1.09  0.78
Other  2.25  2.28  1.88  2.08  1.70  2.00
Operating  surplus  8.65  4.06  6.67  4.48  4.80  6.65
Current  transforo  0.16  0.09  0.04  0.04  0.49  0.26
Adjustment  for  transfers  -0.47  -0.65  -1.21  -0.62  -0.85  -1.27
Capital  revenue  0.28  0.81  0.19  0.80  0.26  0.32
Capital  transfors  0.00  0.08  0.06  0.04  0.06  0.08
Other  capital  revenue  0.28  0.23  0.18  0.26  0.21  0.25
Total  expendituro  and
not  londing  26.61  24.68  24.15  24.14  24.22  24.44
Current  expendituro  16.91  16.87  16.19  18.29  16.6e  16.58
Wages  and salaries  6.98  6.81  6.94  6.78  6.68  5.76
Goods  and  services  1.82  1.72  2.67  2  66  2.70  2.80
Interest  2.40  2.86  8.14  8.96  4.19  8.72
External  debt  1.68  1.97  2.28  2.93  8.01  2.68
Domestic  debt  0.7  0.89  0.86  1.02  1.18  1.04
Curront  transfors  4.86  8.94  8.72  8.61  8.66  8.s8
Othor  current  expenditure  0.41  0.54  0.78  0.42  0.47  0.42
Capital  *xpenditure  9.58  9.12  7.70  7.75  7.38  7.68
Fixed  capital  formation  8.78  8.84  6.74  6.14  6.88  6.70
Capital  transfers  0.11  0.17  0.20  0.81  0.47  0.41
Other  capital  expendituro  0.69  0.61  0.76  0.81  0.58  0.47
Not  lending  0.01  0.09  0.26  0.11  0.16  0.27
Current  account  balanco  8.00  6.88  7.46  6.66  6.19  5.80
Overall  balanco  -0.28  -8.64  -0.82  -1.99  -2.09  -2.24
Net residual  -0.48  -0.71  0.91  0.08  -0.88  0.10
Overall  financing  6.76  4.26  -0.69  1.79  2.91  2.14
Foreign  financing  1.90  8.78  2.08  -0.70  1.60  0.82
Disburement  8.77  4.70  7.08  8.06  5.07  4.90
Amortization  -1.29  -1.69  -2.61  -8.26  -5.78  -4.21
Short  term  -0.58  0.70  -2.48  -0.60  0.21  0.18
Domestic  financing  4.86  0.47  -2.67  2.49  1.41  1.81
Banco  de  Is  Republic&  8.88  0.69  -2.52  1.72  0.27  0.70
Rest  of  financial  system  0.68  -0.09  -0.14  0.86  1.06  0.89
Suppliers  credit  0.00  0.48  -0.85  0.07  0.00  0.00
Bonds  0.80  -0.60  0.80  0.80  0.10  -0.80
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adjustment. Colombia  did not reschedule  its external  debt like other  Latin
American  borrowers.  Although  commercial  banks  were  reluctant  to  continue  lending
it,  the  wake  of  the  global  debt  crisis,  commercial  financing  was  erranged  wit-  the
support  of 2 major  World Bank adjustment  loans.  The large  flow  of external
finance  in  1986,  which  came  at  the  same  time  as  the  surge  in  coffee  revenues,  was
sucessfully  sterilized  through  large  public  sector  repayments  of debt to the
central  bank and repayment  of public  short-term  debt.  In the second  phase,
external  borrowing  was consciously  reduced  by the authorities  in favor of
domestic  borrowing  and  money  creation. This  may  help  to  explain  the  continuing
high real  interest  rates  that  was noted  earlier.
We see  that  the  adjustment  in the  deficit  above  the  line  took  place
on  both  sides  of  the  balance  sheet,  with  a  reduction  in  spending  and  an  increase
in revenue.  The  cut in spending  came  mainly  at the  expense  of public  sector
wages and fixed  capital  formation,  in line  with the typical  pattern  of Latin
American  adjustment.  The  increase  in  revenue  came  primarily  from  increased  tax
revenue  and an increased  operating  surplus  of public  enterprises;  mainly  the
National  Coffee  Fund  and  the  state  oil  company,  ECOPETROL.  The  increase  in  taxes
came  about  through  a  surcharge  on  imports  of  8  percent  (of  import  value)  that  was
implemented  in 1985.
Because  of  the  importance  of  the  fortuitous  coffee  boom  of 1986  in  the
adjustment,  the  question  naturally  arises  to  what  extent  the  fiscal  improvement
was a temporary  one.  Table  4 addresses  this issue  by decomposing  the  deficit
into its temporary  and structural  components.  The first  part of the table
separates  out  various  fiscal  components  that  are  intrinsically  temporary  or are
highly  volatile.  These  include  the  overall  balance  of the  National  Coffee  Fund
as  well  as  the  transfers  it  made  to  the  rest  of  the  public  sector. Also  included22
TAAE  4:  SIlUXTAL  Te  IN FINAL  FOLIC1I1  A.LXT,l.  114-
P  rcait  of  C  (*  deficit/-survlu.)  1954  195  lw  I"?  1911  1969  1964-0
Total  cowoilodetd  pulic  eector  deficit  4.3  a's  0.3  2.0  2.1  23.  -4.04
tbtiseal  Coffee  Fl  id-Daflclt  -0.4  -1.4  -. 2  0.6  -. 0  -0. 1  0.27
-Tresfera  to  PuAI c  Sectw  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.8  0.0  0.0  0.00
I0PETCL-4eWIcit  4.  1  1.3  0.  -O4  0.0  -0.4  4.36
-Tronsfere  to  PublIc  Sor  0.1  0.1  0.  0.64  0.6  0.?  004
btieel  s  r  ra  Itm\1  0.1  0.1  0.3  0.1  0.1  0.1  .0.01
Effect  of  reel  de'elueatlon\  0.0  0.1  0.4  0.4  0.  0.4  0.16
Structural  deficit  7.0  4.0  4.3  4.0  1.1  4.0  4.06
Fined  capitel  focmtima  ,6  0.3  0.7  6.1  6.4  6.?  4.00
StrUral  current  defielt  -1.0  -4.3  24.  4.3  4.3  4.- 7  -0.67
v',  a 'salaries  0.6  6.3  6.6  3.7  3.7  r.6  -1.17
Strutural  errmt  efl1lX  ltet  of  _m1.1  4r.  -10.6  -4.  -7.6  -0.6  4.3  0.16
Rert  cureee.  0.1  0.6  0.7  1.0  1.1  1 0  O."
Structural  curret  defi  lit  Aet of  'me  and Isert  areiar  4.0  -10.1  -7.0  .4.6  -7.0  -7.5  1.16
Xnstr".et  g  te  3.4  1.6  3.1  4.0  4.9  3.7  1.* 
Structul  rrest  pelmrp  dfefit
(not  Of u11.e  A Itort  tern.)  -11.0  -11.9  -10  -10.  -11.0  -11.2  -0.14
Plw:  Total  reel  eacheele  rae.  delaluction  effect  0.?  0.6  0.  0.61
Total  dficit  erncluditq  devati_oI  effect  6.3  J  .7  i.4  3.7  1.7  3.2  -41.3
\1  lnclude  coffee tan  (l1  of  coffee exports),  *  EI  beclpgeent  of  4.01...
OecrQeo 8-16.  aW  asocial  revosue fri.  tee  t4*  a.tfe  (is  191?).
\2  Incude.  On  effect  of  Wm reel dealueatIon eil  1964 me  1tee  Its"
no  Inclu*Ide  e1eere  lot this  table.23
is the balance and transfers  of ECOPETROL,  which became  a large source  of
financing  to the  rest  of the  public  sector  by 1987  thanks  to the  development  of
a  major  new  oil  field. The  fiscal  improvement  was  helped  in  the  first  phase  of
the  adjustment  by increased  profits  of the  National  Coffee  Fund,  which  was the
primary  beneficiary  of  the  surge  in inteLnational  coffee  prices  in  1986,  and  in
the second phase of the adjustment  by ECOPETROL.  There were also some
intrinsically  temporary  developments  that  influenced  the  national  government's
balance,  the  main one being  a tax amnesty  that increased  revenues  in 1987.
Finally,  there  is the  effect  of'the  real  devaluation  that  took  place  beginning
in  1985. This  had  a favorable  effect  on the  fiscal  balance,  which  was  temporary
in the  sense  that  it corrected  an unsustainable  overvaluation  of the  exchange
rate.
Taking  all  of  these  factors  into  account,  we find  that  there  was  still
a  substantial  improvement  in  the  "structural  deficit".  Only  one  percentage  point
of  GDP  of improvement  in  the  deficit  over  1984-89  is  explained  by the  temporary
factors,  so that a fiscal  improvement  of 3 percentage  points  of GDP still
remains.  Colombia  benefitted  from  good  luck,  but  the  main  part  of  the  adjustment
was due  to  her own  efforts.
Another related question that  arises is  how  much  the  fiscal
improvement  was achieved  through  lasting  policy  changes  as  opposed  to  temporary
expedients.  The  evaluation  of the  adjustment  according  to  this  criterion  is  not
so favorable. In the second  part of table  4, the change  in the *structural*
deficit  is  explained  by  only  four  specific  fiscal  components:  public  investment,
wages,  a surcharge  on imports,  and interest  paymeuts. The  reduction  in public
investment  accounts  for  two  percentage  points  of  the  reduction  in  the  structural
deficit.  We will examine  the composition  of this change  below.  The cut in24
spending  on public  wages,  which  accounts  for  one  percent  of the improvement  in
the  fiscal  deficit,  largely  reflects  expedience  since  it  was  achieved  through  a
decline in real wage rates ratner than a  rational  retrenchment  of public
employment.  These two  items alone fully explain the improvement  in the
structural  deficit  over  the  adjustment  period.
The  last  two  items  in  the  table  are  roughly  offsetting.  The  increase
in  interest  payments  reflects  the  consequences  of  the  previous  build-up  of  debt,
the  shift  toward  paying  market  interest  rates  on domestic  debt,  and  the  effect
of the real  devaluation  on external  interest  payments.  The major source  of
increased  revenue  to  keep  up  with  the  increased  interest  burden  was the  increase
in  the  tax  on imports  mentioned  earlier.  While  increased  revenue  was  desirable,
the  means  chosen  again  was  driven  mainly  by expedience  than  rational
long-run  policy.  Higher  growth  in  the  future  lA'&ely  requires  increased  openness,
which  will eventually  require  a reduction  of tariff  rates.
In  order  to  evaluate  the  reduction  in  public  investment,  we need  more
information  about  the  composition  of  the  cuts. Figure  11  shows  the  evolution  of
public  investment  since  1970.  As  was  noted  earlier,  much  of  the  fiscal  expansion
that  triggered  the  near-crisis  was due  tc public  investments  in electric  power
and in  mining (coal  and oil).  There  was  also some  expansion  in social  sector
investments.  The  sectors  that  expanded  earlier  were  precisely  those  cut  during
the adjustment  program.  The largest  adjustment  came in the electric  power
sector.  This  was a rational  reduction  in spending,  since  excess  generation
capacity  had  been  created  during  the  large  investments  of the  early  80's. The
large  reduction  of investment  in  the  mining  sector  mostly  reflected  the  phasing
out of lumpy  expenditures  on the  development  of the new oil and coal fields.
Moreover,  expenditure  on  infrastructure  actually  expanded  during  the  adjustment1tIDOS  o  suniinoluE>e 
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program,  which  largely  reflected  spending  on the  telecommunications  sector  and
the construction  of a metro in Medellin  (although  the latter  was of dubious
economic  value).  More questionable  for long-run  prospects  was  the large
reduction in  social  investments  during  the adjustment  program and the failure  to
increase  agriculture  investment. On balance,  the iargest  part of the public
investment  redt,ction  was rational  and not necessarily  prejudicial  to future
growth.
The  conclusions  of table  4 are  rather  mixed. They  suggest  that  some
means  chosen  for  fiscal  adjustment  were  prejudical  to  long-run  growth. Improved
growth  performance  will likely  require  the reversal  of some of the fiscal
adjustment  measures  of  1985-89  and  their  replacement  by  less  distortionary  fiscal
instruments  to  maintain  the  deficit  within  bounds.
4.  Decomvosition  of the  coffee  balance  in  Colombia
The  balance  of  the  National  Coffee  Fund  in  Colombia  is  one  of the  most
important,  and  most  volatile,  components  of the  overall  public  sector  deficit.
As shown  in figure  12, it has swung  widely  over the past decade.  The sharp
improvement  in  public  sector  finances  in  1986,  for  example,  was  in  good  part  due
to  an  improvement  in  the  balance  of  the  Coffee  Fund. The  Coffee  Fund's  financial
balance  is  the  main transmission  mechanism  for  the  wide swings  in  world  coffee
prices  to affect  the  fiscal  balance. It is  also  an important  way in  which  the
real  exchange  rate  affects  the  fiscal  balance. It is  useful  to first  describe
how  the  coffee  price  and  the  real  exchange  rate  will  affect  the  Coffee  Fund,  and
then do a numerical  decomposition  of the coffee  balance into autonomous  and
endogenous  components.Figure  12
COLOMBIA: BALANCE  OF COFFEE  FUND
AND PRODUCER  PRICE  RATIO
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The  National Coffee Fund  is  a  quasi-public institution that
administers  a  bewildering  array  of  coffee  policy  instruments  in  consultation  with
the  national  government.  Through  various  instruments  it  creates  a  wedge  between
the  international  price  of coffee  and  the  domestic  producer  price  that  it  pays
to private  coffee  farmers. The  majority  of the  Colombian  coffee  crop  passes
through  the  Fund before  being  exported,  and so it receives  revenues  from  the
price differential. The domestic  producer  price is adjusted  in response  to
changes  in  the  exchange  rate  and  the  dollar  coffee  price,  but  the  pass-though  is
not 100  percent;  we will estimate  a reaction  function  below.  In effect,  the
Coffee  Fund plays a traditional  price-smoothing  role  for domestic  producers.
This  implies  that  the  ratio  of  world  to  domestic  producer  prices  will  go  up (and
Coffee Fund net revenues  will go up) when either the real exchange  rate
depreciates  or the  coffee  price  increases.
In addition,  there  is a tax  on coffee  export  revenues  that  is shared
between  the  national  government  and  the  coffee  fund. This  tax  implies  that  there
will be a direct  effect  of both the real  exchange  rate  and the international
coffee  price  on  Coffee  Fund  net  revenues  besides  the  effect  through  the  producer
price  ratio.
Figure  12 shows  the  behavior  of the  coffee  balance  and the  producer
price  ratio,  which  in  turn  drpends  on  world  coffee  prices  and  the  real  exchange
rate.  The  balance  of the  Coffee  Fund  follows  closely  the  coffee  price  cycle.
Large surpluses  were associated  with  peaks in  coffee  prices  in 1977  and 1986.
The producer  price ratio  also mirrors  closely  the behavior  of international
prices,  as is  consistent  with  price-smoothing  behavior.
The  association  with the  real  exchange  rate  is  more  complicated.  The
real exchange  rate  peaked  before  coffee  prices  in 1975,  then appreciated  as29
coffee  prices  rose. The  two  phenomena  are  linked,  since  the  coffee  price  has  a
strong  effect  on the  overall  terms  of trade,  which  as  we  will see  elsewhere  in
the  paper,  negatively  affects  the  real  exchange  rate  in  the  long  run. In  1986,
the  effect  of  the  rise  in  the  coffee  price  on  Coffee  Fund  finances  was  reinforced
by a strong  real  depreciation  in 1985-86.
These  associations  are  confirmed  by econometric  results. Regression
1  shows  the  ratio  of  the  Coffee  Fund  surplus  to  GDP  as  a function  of the  producer
price  ratio  and  the  real  domestic  unit  value  of coffee  exports. The latter  is
the  product  of  the  real  international  price  of  coffee  and  the  real  exchange  rate.
Both  variables  are  statistically  significant  with  the  expected  signs.
The  results  indicate  that  a  higher  producer  price  ratio  leads  to  a  higher  Coffee
Fund surplus;  this is to be expected  since  the  excess  of international  prices
over  domestic  producer  pr! es  is  the  Coffee  Fund's  profit  margin  on  purchases  of
coffee  for  export. In addition,  there  is  a  significant  positive  effect  of the
real domestic  unit value of coffee  exports;  this reflects  the direct  tax on
coffee  exports  that  partially  accrues  to the  Coffee  Fund.
We also find  a strong  econometric  relationship  between  the  producer
price ratio  and the real exchange  rate and  world coffee  price.  Here  we try
different  specifications  for  a reaction  function  for  the  authorities  to adjust
the  domestic  producer  price  in  response  to  changes  in  the  exchange  rate  and  world
coffee  price.
The  first  specification  is an error  correction  model  for  the  nominal
domestic  producer  price  to adjust  to the nominal  exchange  rate  and the  world
coffee  price in nominal  dollars.  The error  correction  approach  is useful  to
detect  spurious  correlations  between  variables,  as  well  as  giving  an  appealing30
Regression  .
Variabless
LGlCOFFD&GDP  - log(l+  Coffee  fund  surplus/GDP)
LN(COFF  INT&DOM)  - log(Int'l/Domestic  Coffee  price)
LNCOFF  WRL3  - log(Int'l  Coffee  price)  + log(Avg  Exch  Rate)
- log(CPI)
REGRESS  :  dependent  variable  is  LG1COFFD&GDP
Using  1974  - 1988
Variable  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
-------------------- __----_---------------_-----------------_----
Constant  -. 439365E-01  .105,-2E-01  -4.17440  .001
LN(COFF_INT&DOM)  .456545E-01  .143980E-01  3.17090  .008
LNCOFF  WRL3  .137274E-01  .662450E-02  2.07222  .060
-- __--__--------------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  a  15  R2-  .8035  (adj)-  .7707
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - .362563E-03  Std.  Error  of Reg.-  .5497E-02
Log(likelihood)  - 58.4436  Durbin-Watson  2  2.08685
Schwarz  Criterion  - 54.3816  F (  2,  12)  - 24.5295
Akaike  Criterion  =  55.4436  Significance  - .000058
model of short-run  adjustment  and long-run  equilibrium. We use the 2-stage
procedure  suggested  by Engle  and  Granger  (1987).
Regressions  2 and 3 show  the first  and second  stage  regressions.
In the  first  stage  regression,  the  level  of the  log  of the  domestic  producer
price is regressed on the the levels of the log exchange rate and  log
international  coffee  price. This  regression  can  be interpreted  as the  long  run
relationship  between  these  variables.  Note  that  the  coefficient  on  the  exchange




LNCOFDOMP  - log(Domestic  coffee  price)
LNCOFXPINTL  - log(International  coffee  price)
LNEXCH  AVG  - log(Average  Exchange  Rate)
REGRESS  i  dependent  variable  is  LNCOFDOMP
Using  1970  - 1988
Variable  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
----------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTANT  -.339408  .120838  -2.80878  .013
LNCOFXPINTL  .710606  .558219E-01  12.7299  .000
LNEXCH  AVG  1.06649  .312462E-01  34.1318  .000
---------_------------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  - 19  R2-  .9939  (adj)-  .9932
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - .143654  Std.  Error  of  Reg.-  .9475E-01
Log(likelihood)  a  19.4456  Durbin-Watson  - 1.38480
Schwarz  Criterion  - 15.0290  F (  2,  16)  - 1313.72
Akaike  Criterion - 16.4456  Significance  . .000000
In the second stage regression,  shown as Regression  3, the log
difference  of the  domestic  producer  price  is  determined  by the log  differences
of the  exchange
Regression  3
Variables:
DLNCOFD  - log(Domest  Coff  price),  - log(Domest  Coff  price),.,
DLNCOFXPINTL  - log(Int'l  Coff  price),  - log(Int'l  Coff  price),-,
DLNEXCH  AVG  - log(Avg  Exch rate),  - log(Avg  Exch rate),-,
REGRESS  :  dependent  variable  is DLNCOFD
Using  1971  - 1988
Variable  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
----------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTANT  .621103E-01  .365742E-01  1.69820  .112
DLNCOFXPINTL  .521414  .641270E-01  8.13095  .000
DLNEXCH  AVG  .730801  .207096  3.52880  .003
RESID(-1)  -.710178  .193716  -3.66608  .00332
------------------------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  - 18  R2-  .8658  (adj)-  .8370
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - .731925E-01  Std.  Error  of Reg.-  .7231E-01
Log(likelihood)  - 24.0044  Durbin-Watson  - 1.57765
Schwarz  Criterion  - 18.2237  F (  3.  14)  - 30.0974
Akaike  Criterion - 20.0044  Significance  - .000002
rate  and  coffee  price,  plus  the  lagged  residual  from  the  first  stage  regression.
The latter  can be interpreted  as the  correction'  for the deviation  of the
domestic  price  from its  long-run  relationship.  The coefficient  on the  coffee
price  is  even  lower  than  in  the  first  regression,  implying  only  52  percent  pass-
through,  while the coefficient  on the  exchange  rate implies  73 percent  pass-
through. The  coefficient  on  the *correction'  term  implies  that  71  percent  of a
deviation  from  the  long-run  relationship  is  corrected  in  the  first  period. All
of the  variables  are  highly  significant.
We try an alternative  specification  of the real domestic  producer
price  as determined  by the real  world  coffee  price  and  the  real  exchange  rate.
This implicitly  assumes  that domestic  producer  prices  are indexed  fully  to
domestic  inflation,  then  adjusted  for  changes  in  external  fundamentals  such  as
coffee  prices  and the exchange  rate.  The first-stage  regression  in levels  is
shown  as  Regression  4,  and  the  second-stage  regression  is  shown  as  Regression  5.
The  first-stage  regression  shows  somewhat  lower  pass-through  of  coffee  prices  and
exchange  rates  than in the previous  specification.  The real  coffee  price  is
strongly  significant  in the  second  stage,  with pass-through  again  close  to33
Regression  4
Variables:
LNCOFDM_CPI  - log(Domestic  coffee  price)  - log(CPI)
LNCOFINTL  WPI  - log(US$  Int'l  coffee  price)  - log(USA  'Wholesale
Price  Index)
LNEXCH_CPI  WPI  - log(Avg  Exch  rate)  - log(CPI)  +  log(USA  WPI)
REGRESS  :  dependent  variable  is  LNCOFDM_CFI
Using  1970  - 1988
Variable  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
----------------------------------------------------------------
CONSTANT  -1.07446  .815152  -1.31811  .206
LNCOFINTL  WPI  .605558  .770591E-01  7.85836  .000
LNEXCH_CPI_WPI  .865795  .172869  5.00838  .000
--- _--_-----E--------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  - 19  R2-  .8162  (adJ)-  .7932
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - .147591  Std.  Error  of  Reg.-  .96044E-01
Log(likelihood)  - 19.1888  Durbin-Watson  - 1.10250
Schwarz  Criterion  - 14.7721  F (  2,  16)  - 35.5207
Akaike  Criterion - 16.1888  Significance  - .000001
about  50  percent. The  error  correction  term  is  again  strongly  significant,  and
even  higher  than  before,  implying  around  85  percent  correction  of  deviation  from
equilibrium  in the first period.  However,  the exchange  rate term is not
significantly  different  than  zero  in the  second-stage  regression.  There  is  no
evidence  here  to  support  an  effect  of  the  real  exchange  rate  on  the  real  producer
price.
The  two  specifications  give  fairly  similar  results  for  simulation  of
coffee  surpluses  and  producer  price  ratios. The  second  specification  is  chosen.4
Regression  5
Variabless
DLNCOFDM_CPI  - lncofdm  cpi,  - lncofdm  cpit. 1
DLNCOFINTL WPI - lncofintlywpi  - lncofintl  wpi, 1
DLNEXCH_CPI  WPI- lnexch_cpi  wpi,  - lnexch_cpi_wpi, 1
REGRESS  s  dependent  variable  is  DLNCODDMHCPI
Using  1971  - 1988
Variable  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
---- _----------------------------_------------------------------
CONSTANT  .469365E-02  .194324E-01  .241537  .813
DLNCOFINTL  WPI  .513535  .682378E-01  7.52567  .000
DLNEXCH_CPI  WPI  .2346j5  .361924  .648354  .527
RESIDl(-l)  -. 849083  .257471  -3.29778  .005
-______------_------ Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  - 18  R2-  .8467  (adj)-  .8138
Sum  of Sq.  Re"id.  . .863603E-01  Std.  Error  of Reg.-  .7854E-01
Log(likelihood)  - 22.5155  Durbin-Watson  - 1.74491
Schwarz Criterion . 16.7347  F (  3,  14)  - 25.7731
Akaike  Criterion - 18.5155  Significance  - .000006
for  decomposition  of the  deficit  because  the  resulting  decompositions  are  more
intuitively  plausible.  Figures  13 and 14 show the model simulation  for the
coffee  surplus  and  the  producer  price  ratio. We see  that  the  model  tracks  well
the  main swings  of the  cycle. The  main  departure  from  the  model  is  the  rise  in
both  the  coffee  surplus  and  producer  price  ratio  in  1979,  which  is  not  explained
by  movements  of the  real  exchange  rate  or  coffee  price.
We can  use  the  model  to  decompose  the  deficit  into  elements  determined
by  coffee  price  changes,  real  exchange  rate  changes,  and  other. To do this,  we
simulate  the  model  first  for  the  actual  values  of  the  real  coffee  price  and  theFigure  13
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real  exchange  rate. We then  simulate  the  model  for  the  coffee  price  and  the  real
exchange  rate fiked  at their  1974  values.  The difference  between  these  two
simulations  is the amount  of the surplus  that is accounted  for  by the change
since  1974 irn  the real exchange  rate and the coffee  price.  To distinguish
between  them,  we fix  one of the  variables  at the  1974  value  and let  the  other
take its  actual  value.  The  difference  between  this simulation  and the  one  in
which  both  are  fixed  is  the  amount  of  the  surplus  explained  by the  variable  that
we allow  to take  its  actual  value.
Figure  15 shows  the resulting  decomposition  of the coffee  surplus.
It is clear  that  the  coffee  price  is  the  dominant  influence  on the  behavior  of
the  coffee  surplus,  accounting  especially  for  the  peaks  in 1977  and  1986. The
coffee  price  effect  amounted  to 3  percent  of  GDP  in  1977  and  1  percent  of  GDP  in
1986,  reverting  to -1  percent  with the  collapse  of  prices  in  1987.
The real  exchange  rate  plays  a comparatively  minor role,  depressing
the  coffee  surplus  in  the  late  70's  and  early  80's,  and  increasing  it  in  1985-87.
The  residual  surplus  (labelled  "other"  in  the  graph)  is  the  sum  of  the  underlying
surplus  given  by the  simulation  in  which  both  the  coffee  price  and  real  exchange
rate are fixed (about  half a percent  of GDP and roughly  constant)  and the
residual  from  the  simulation  with  both  independent  variables  taking  their  actual
values. The  residual  surplus  plays  some  role  in  the  fluctuations  of the  coffee
surplus,  especially  in  1979  and  1987. This  reflects  both  the  unexplained  portion
of the producer  price ratio (which  was significant  in 1979),  and autonomous
actions  by the  Coffee  Fund such  as  purchases  or sales  of inventories.
In conclusion,  the coffee  surplus  plays  a major role in the  public
finances  of  Colombia,  being  the  major  vehicle  by  which  exogenous  terms  of tradeFlgure  15
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shocks  to coffee  prices  affect  public  sector  deficits. We have seen  that  the
real  coffee  price  affects  the  coffee  surplus  through  both the  producer  price
ratio  and directly  through  coffee  export  tax revenues;  the total  effect  has
ranged  from  plus  3 percent  to -1  percent  of GDP over  the  period  1975-88. The
real  exchange  rate  plays  a  comparatively  minor  role.  Autonomous  movements  in  the
coffee  surplus  have  also  been important  in  some  years.
III. FISCAL  DEFICITS,  REAL  INTEREST  RATES,  AND INFLATION
1.  Basic  framework
To  analyze  the  effect  of the  financing  of fiscal  deficits  on interest
rates and  inflation,  we  use  the model presented in the proposal.  For
convenience,  the  basic  structure  will  be  presented  here. The  basic  relationship
is that  of the  fiscal  deficit  (Def)  to its  means  of financings
(1)  Def  = Lg  + Ldg  + F  * E + BNOL
where  Lde  is  government  borrowing from the  banking system,  L.,  is credit from the
central  bank,  F. is foreign  debt,  and  BNOL 1 are  net other liabilities  of the
government.  The  evolution  of government  borrowing  from  the  banking  system  and
the  central  bank  determine  the  equilibria  in  the  market  for  credit  and  the  money
market,  respectively.  These  two  markets  are cleared  by the  domestic  interest
rate and the price level.  Thus, it is the composition  of financing  of the
deficit  that  will  determine  the  interest  rate  and  inflation  rate  in  this  model. 5
8This  is  similar  to  the  consistency  relationship  between  fiscal  deficits  and
inflation  proposed  by  Anand  and  Van  Wijnbergen  (1989),  except  that  we also  allow
for  portfolio  shifts  between  money  and  interest-bearing  assets.40
The  equilibrium  in the  credit  market  will  be given  by:
(2)  L dg= (l-r)  P c(Ml (1-c)  +  QM) - L dp- Othd
where  r is the  reserve  requirement,  P.  is the  consumption  deflator,  Ml is real
demand  for  narrow  money,  c is  the  ratio  of currency  to  narrow  money,  QM is  real
demand  for  quasimoney,  L,,  is  private  demand  for  credit,  and  Othd is net  other
assets  of the  banking  system. This  expression  just says  that  deposits  in  the
banking  system,  less  the  amount  set  aside  for  reserves,  must  be  equal  to  private
and  public  credit  demand  plus  net  other  assets  of the  banking  system.
Private  credit  demand  LdP will evolve  with private  investment  Ip:
(3)  Lp  =  (1+7r)(1-CR)  Ldp (-1)  +  Pp  l*7
where  X  is the  inflation  rate  (in  terms  of the  GDP deflator),  CR  is the  rate  of
depreciation  of  physical capital, P  is the GDP  deflator, 1I is private
investment,  and  7  is the  ratio  of private  credit  to the  private  capital  stock.
This  expression  is  derived  from  the  assumption  that  the  ratio  of  private  domestic
debt to the  nominal  value  of capital  (the  leverage  ratio)  stays  constant  over
time. This  implies  that  the  inflation  component  of  interest  payments  on  the  debt
(w  times  the  previous  stock  of debt)  will always  be rolled  over.  A constant
share  of gross  investment  will be financed  by borrowing,  but there  will be an
adjustment  for  depreciation  on  past  capital,  as reflected  in  past  debt.
The equilibrium  in the  money  market  will be given  by the  condition
that  the  supply  of high-powered  money  H equal  the  demands41
(4)  H =  P *  MI *  (c+r (1-c))  +  r*P*QM
where  the  components  correspond  to  currency  demand,  reserves  on  demand  deposits,
and  reserves  on  quasimoney,  respectively.  The  supply  of  high-powered  money  must
be in turn consistent  with the outstanding  credit  to the government  by the
central  bank:
(5)  Lcg  = H - NFAcb  - Othc
where  NFAcb  are  net foreign  assets  of the  central  bank,  and  Othc  are  net other
assets  of the  central  bank.
2.  Econometrically-estimated  behavioral  equations
To complete  this  framework,  we need to specify  behavioral  equations
for  money  demand,  quasimoney  demand,  private  investment,  and  total  output,  as
well  as  determining  interest  rate  spreads.  We  also  must  estimate  an  equation  for
private  consumption  so  as  to  determine  the  private  saving  flow  that  corresponds
to accumulation  of  money  and  quasimoney.
For  private  portfolio  deaands,  we suppose  a 3 asset  system  of  money,
quasimoney,  and  foreign  assets. It  is  enough  to  specify  behavioral  equations  for
the first  two,  with foreign  assets  determined  as a residual  from the balance
sheet  condition  for  the  private  sector. Although  holding  of foreign  assets  is
legally  restricted  in  Colombia,  the  existence  of  a thriving  underground  economy
and  a flow  of remittances  from  abroad  make  for  a  high  degree  of  defacto  capital
mobility. The  existence  of a parallel  market  premium  implies  mobility  is  not42
perfect,  but the premium is seldom  above 5 percent (and sometimes  is even
negative!)
We thus model quasimoney  demand  as reflecting  the possibility  of
substitution  between domestic and foreign interest-bearing  assets.  Real
quasimoney  demand  (deflated  by the  consumption  deflator)  is  hypothesized  to be
a function  of domestic  interest  rates,  the  inflation  rate (reflecting  also  the
possibility  of  substitution  into  real  assets),  the  foreign  interest  rate  plus  the
rate  of depreciation,  and  real  income. In the  estimation  process,  we were  not
able  to identify  any  separate  effect  of  currency  depreciation  in  addition  to  the
effect  of  inflation.  This  probably  reflects  the  crawling  peg  system  in  Colombia,
in which  current  inflation  is the  best predictor  of future  depreciation  (the
occasional  large  devaluations  are  usually  unanticipated).  We  also  constrain  the
income  elasticity  of demand  for  quasimoney  to  be one  in the  estimation.'  Thus,
the  estimated  equation  shows  the  log  of the  ratio  of real  quasimoney  to GDP  as
a  function  of the  real  deposit  rate,  which  is  the  nominal  deposit  rate  adjusted
for the ex-post  rise in the  consumption  deflator. The results  are shown  as
Regression  (6):
eThis  restriction  is emphatically  rejected  by the  data,  which  would  imply
an income  elasticity  of  2.4. Such  a large  elasticity  would  lead  to implausible
simulation  results,  so  we impose  the  income  elasticity  of  unity. The  reasons  for
the  explosive  income  elasticity  will be investigated  in further  research. For
an analysis  of  stability  of  money  demand,  see  Carrasquilla  and  Renteria  (1990).43
Rearession  (6)
CORC :  dependent  variable  is  Demand  for  Log (quasi.money/GDP)
Using  1973  - 1988
Variable  I Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
____________________  I--------------I_____________I  ……  -----------  I  …  --
^CONST  -2.47391  0.186360  |  -13.2749  I  0.000
Real interest  rate  1.43222  0.625282  I  2.29051  0.038
Lagged  error  term 7 0.849253  I 0.131997  |  6.43390  |  0.000
------------------------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  - 16  R2-  0.9200  (adj)- 0.9142
Lum  of Sq.  Resid - 0.169050  Std.  Error  of Reg.-  0.109886
Log(likelihood) . 13.6982  Durbin-Watson  - 1.89415
Schwarz  Criterion  1  10.9256  F (  1,  14)  - 160.900
Akaike  Criterion - 11.6982  Significance  - 0.000000
----------  Autocorrelation  Estimation  Summary  ----------------
Initial  Rho(l)  - 0.00000  Final  Rho(l)  - 0.84925
Std  Error  of Rho(l)  - 0.13200  t-value  (sig)  - 6.434  (0.000)
R-Squared  based  on transformed  (differenced)  model  - 0.42596
Convergence  at iteration  7
The  real  demand  for  narrow  money  is  specified  to  depend  on  the  nominal
deposit  interest  rate  and real  income. The results  for  a regression  in levels
were unsatisfactory,  so  we specified  an error  correction  format.  Regression
(7a)  shows  the  first  stage  levels  regression  of  the  log  of real  money  on  the  log
of real  gdp,  the  nominal  interest  rate,  and  a time  trend.  Regression  (7b)  gives
the regression  in differences  with the lagged  residual  from the first  stage
regression  as  one  of  the  explanatory  variables.  Both  real  income  and  the  nominal
interest rate are  .ignificant,  as is  the residual from the first stage
regression.  This  specification  has  the  intuitively  appealing  interpretation  that
the  real growth  in money  demand  responds  to real income  growth  and  changes  in
7  or the  ^RHO  which is  the  autocorrelation  coefficient  from  the  Cochrane-
Orcutt  regression.44
interest  rates,  with a  correction  for  the  long  run  relationship  between  levels
of money  and  GDP.  The  negative  time  trend  in the levels  regression  implies  a
secular  tendency  to  move  away  from  Ml,  which  could  reflect  technical  change  that
economizes  on the  use  of  money  in transactions.
Regression  (7a)
REGRESS  :  dependent  variable  is  Ln (Real  Ml)
Using  1965  - 1988
Variable  I  Coefficient  Std  Err  I  T-stat  I  Signf
…_____________________I…______--  - --  - -I  ……__---- -----I  --------- …  - --- I  …
aCONST  |  -12.9757  I  3.47126  -3.73804  0.001
Ln (Real  GDP)  I  1.73268  0.228106  7.59594  I  0.000
Nominal  Interest  rate I  -0.218988  0.178090  I  -1.22965  I  0.233
Time  Trend  I  -0.409874E-011  0.101437E-011  -4.04069  0.001
-----------------------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  - 24  R2-  0.9727  (adj)- 0.9686
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - 0.431522E-01  Std.  Error  of Reg.-  0.46450lE-0!
Log(likelihood)  - 41.7984  Durbin-Watson  - 1.18149
Schwarz  Criterion  - 35.4423  F (  3,  20)  - 237.672
Akaike  Criterion - 37.7984  Significance  - 0.000000
In the  estimation  of the  behavioral  equation  for  private  investment,
only  real  income  and  the  user  cost  of capital  were found  to  be significant.  We
tested  tne  hypothesis  in  the  project  proposal  that  the  public  capital  stock  has
a  positive  effect  on  private  investment,  but  this  was  not  confirmed  by the  data.
Capacity  utilization  and  profit  variables  were  also  tried  without  success. The
final  estimation --  shown as regression (8) --  constrains the income  elasticity
of  private  investment  demand  to  be one,  which  was  not  rejected  by the  data. The
user cost of capital  is defined  as the relative  price  of capital  gocds (the
investment  deflator  divided  by the  GDP  deflator)  times  the real  interest  rate45
(the  nominal  loan  rate  adjusted  for  the  change  in  the  GDP  deflator).  The  change
in the  GDP  deflator  worked  better  than  the  ex-post  rate  of change  in the
investment  deflator  as a  measure  of the  expected  capital  price  increase  in  the
real interest  rate definition,  perhaps reflecting  again the smoothness  of
inflation  over  time  except  for  unexpected  shifts  in  relative  prices  of  investment
goods.
Regression  (7b)
REGRESS  :  dependent  variable  is  Money  Demand  =  log(real  ml) - log(real  ml(-l))
Using  1966  - 1988
Variable  I  Coefficient I  Std  Err  T-stat  I  Signf
-------------------- …I-------------I-…-----  ------ I  ……_--  -----  ---- I  …__-  - -
^CONST  I  -0.342711E-011  0.272399E-011  -1.25812  1  0.224
Difference  ln(gdp)  j  1.66381  I  0.561546  I  2.96290  I  0.008
Difference  int  rate  -0.532078  I  0.238691  -2.22915  I  0.038
Lagged  residual  -0.692107  |  0.259542  -2.66665  |  0.015
------------------------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  . 23  R2-  0.4369  (adj)= 0.3480
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - 0.339841E-01  Std.  Error  of  Reg.-  0.422923E-01
Log(likelihood)  - 42.3140  Durbin-Watson  1.46300
Schwarz  Criterion  *  36.0430  F (  3,  19)  4.91456
Akaike  Criterion - 38.3140  Significance  - 0.01079146
Regression  (8)
REGRESS: dependent  variable  is  Log (Real  Private  Investment/  Real  GDP)
Using  1970  - 1988
Variable  |  Coefficient I  Std  Err  T-stat  I  Signf
________________I______________I---  __________-  I  ……  I  …  __,__
ACONST  |  -2.08120  1  0.415038E-011  -50.1449  1  0.000
user  cost  I  I  I  I
of capitals  I -1.70804  I  0.588792  I -2.90092  0.010
---__------------------  Equation  Summary  -----------------------
No.  of  Observations  =  19  R2-  0.3311  (adj)- 0.2918
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - 0.209058  Std.  Error  of  Reg.-  0.110894
Log(likelihood)  15.8812  Durbin-Watson  j  1.56057
Schwarz  Criterion  - 12.9368  F (  1,  17)  - 8.41535
Akaike  Criterion - 13.8812  Significance  =  0.009943
The  semi-logarithmic  elasticity  of  private  investment  with respect  to
the  user  cost  of  capital  is  quite  high  at 1.7. As pointed  out  before,  the  ratio
of real private investment  to GDP shows a  secular  decline,  which is only
partially  explained  by  this  equation  since  the  decline  began  before  the  start  of
this  sample  period. The  user  cost  of capital  has  risen  over  time,  both  because
of a rise in the real loan interest  rate (figure  5) and an increase  in the
relative  price  of  capital  goods  (figure  7). As  noted  above,  the  rise  in  the  real
interest  rate  took  place  mainly  in  the  1980's  and  may have  been  related  to the
large  fiscal  deficits  of that  period.
Real  consumption  is  specified  as  a function  of lagged  consumption  and
real  disposable  income. This  specification  allows  either  the  permanent  income
or Keynesian  liquidity-constrained  hypotheses  to  hold.  The lagged  consumption
term  is consistent  with the  permanent  income  hypothesis,  since  it reflects  all
a  user cost of capital  - investment  deflator/GDP  deflator  * real loan
interest  rate47
information  about permanent income that was  available last period.  The
disposable  income  term  both  reflects  new  information  about  permanent  income  and
is  the  relevant  variable  for  liquidity-constrained  consumers  in  the  economy.  We
tested  other  variables  suggested  in  the  proposal,  such  as real  interest  rates,
government  consumption,  and the stock of money, but found them all to be
insignificant.  Real disposable  income is defined as nominal income less
government  revenues  net of subsidies  and less the inflation  tax on money
balances,  deflated  by  the  consumption  deflator.  The  inflation  tax  is  defined  as
the  inflation  rate  in  terms  of  the  consumer  price  deflator  times  the  lagged  money
base.9
Regression  (9a)  shows  the  estimated  results.  Two-stage  least  squares
is used to take into  account  the  simultaneity  between  consumption  and  current
income. We can  see  that  the  sum  of the  estimated  coefficients  is  close  to  one,
which  would  imply  that  consumption  is  proportional  to  disposable  income  in  the
long  run. A formal  test  of this  restriction  fails  to reject  it;  accordingly  it
is  imposed  in  Regression  (9b). Both  the  restricted  and  unrestricted  regressions
show  a strong  effect  of  current  disposable  income. It  seems  unlikely  this  would
reflect  only  new information  about  pe.'manent  income--liquidity  constraints  on
consumers  must be quite important.  This is consistent  with the results  of
Cuddington  (1989),  who found  a higher  propensity  to consume  out  of temporary
rather  than  permanent  income,  and  in  contrast  to  the  results  of  Clavijo  (1989),
who tends  to confirm  the  permanent  income  hypothesis.
'The  'tax  rate'  actually  must  be  defined  as  the  inflation  rate  over  one  plus
the  inflation  rate  to constrain  the  'tax  rate'  between  zero  and  one.48
Regression  (9a)
TWOSLSt dependemt  variable  is  Log  of  Real  Prfvate  Consumption  (Cp)
Using  1971  - 1986
Exogenous  Variables
___________________
constant,  lagged  consump  (DV),  log (gov't  consump),
exports,  disposable  income
Variable  I  Coefficient |  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
…___________________I_______  ______-I_________  ___ I--------------  I  …_..-_
ACONST  0.472775  I  0.429891  I  1.09975  1 0.291
lagged  consumption  0.490119  I 0.223008  2.19776  I  0.047
ln  disposable  income  I  0.477914  I  0.243768  I  1.96052  0.072
------- °---------------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Obs.  - 16  R2-  0.997  (adJ)- 0.996  Durbins  H- -0.73675
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - 0.189280E-02  Std.  Error  of  Reg.-  0.120665E-01
Log(likelihood)  - 49.6353  Durbin-Watson  - 1.91136
Schwarz  Criterion  - 45.4764  F  (  2,  13)  - 1946.06
Akaike  Criterion - 46.6353  Significance  - 0.000000
Regression j9b)
TWOSLS: dependent  variable  is log(Cp)  - log(Cp(-l))
Using  1971  - 1986
Exogenous  Variables
___________________
constant,  lagged  consump,  gov't  consump,  exports,  disp income
Variable  I  Coefficient I  Std  Err  I  T-stat  I  Signf
…----------------------I…_---  -----  ---- I-------------I--------------I  …-  - _
^CONST  |  -0.564652E-011  0.207139E-01|  -2.72595  |  0.016
log  real  disposable  I 0.724066  0.151318  1  4.78507  I  0.000
income
- log (Cp-l)  I  I  I  I
__--__.__________-___  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  - 16  R2-  0.6604  (adJ)- 0.6361
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - 0.239054E-02  Std.  Error  of Reg.-  0.130673E-0l
Log(likelihood)  - 47.7676  Durbin-Watson  - 1.58501
Schwarz  Criterion  - 44.9950  F (  1,  14)  - 27.2235
Akaike  Criterion - 45.7676  Significance  - 0.00013049
The  final  behavioral  equation  is  that  for  overall  GDP  growth. Output
per  worker  is  specified  as  a  function  of  the  stocks  of  public  and  private  capital
per  worker. To  capture  the  cyclical  behavior  of  output,  we model  the  error  term
from  this  equation  as  an  AR(2)  process. This  implies  that  the  underlying  trend
of  output  will be  given  by the  evolution  of  capital  stocks,  while  actual  output
will follow  a cycle  around  this trend.  The regression  is estimated  over  t..,
period  1927-88,  with  a  dummy  for  the  years  of  World  War  2,  as  shown  in  regression
10.  The results  show a strong  effect  of public  capital  on output,  with an
elasticity  of almost  .5. The  sum  of the  elasticities  of output  with respect  to
public  and  private  capital  is  greater  than  one,  in  contrast  to  the  conventional
Regression  (10)
LS /f  Dependent  Variable  is  Ln (Output  per  worker)
Date:  6-06-1990  /  Time:  11:27
SMPL ranget 1927  - 1988
Number  of observations:  62
Convergence  achieved  after  2 iterations
VARIABLE  COEFFICIENT  STD.  ERROR  T-STAT.  2-TAIL  SIG.
C  -1.2678325  0.3694451  -3.4317208  0.001
Private  cap stk  0.7000028  0.0964987  7.2540151  0.000
per  worker
Public  cap stk  0.4787963  0.0684088  6.9990441  0.000
per  worker
DUMWAR  -0.0306359  0.0159174  -1.9246792  0.059
Error  term (-1)  1.3973519  0.1061180  13.167912  0.000
Error  term (-2)  -0.6036747  0.1054786  -5.7231941  0.000
R-squared  0.997269  Mean  of dependent  var  6.427988
Adjusted  R-squared  0.997025  S.D.  of dependent  var  0.431955
S.E.  of regression  0.023559  Sum  of squared  resid  0.031081
Durbin-Watson  stat  1.971940  F-statistic  4090.208
Log likelihood  147.573z
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neoclv-  :ical  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  in  which  the  elasticity  of  output
with  respect  to  t6tal  capital  is  well  below  one. Thus,  strong  increasing  returns
are implicit  in these results,  although  this equation  is not intended  as a
rigorous  test  of returns  to scale.
The  other  matter  that  must  be  addressed  is  the  spread  between  loan  and
deposit  interest  rates,  since  the  former  enters  into  investment  and  the  latter
into  money  and  quasimoney  demands. We assume  that the  spread  between  deposit
rate  iD and  loan  rate  iL is explained  by the  reserve  requirement  (r)  and  an
exogenous component io, which would  include profits and other costs of
intermediation:
(10)  i  -=  i  L(1-0  - i  0
If we write the nominal  loan rate as the sum of the real loan rate and the
inflation  rate,  then  the  nominal  deposit  rate  can  be  written  as  a  function  of  the
real  loan  rate  and  inflation  as follows:'°
(11)  i  D= (l-r)(r  L+ )  - i  O
while  the  real  deposit  rate  will  be given  as:
(12)  D  -a  (1-r)  r  L- rr  - i
1°Actual  inflation  is  used  throughout  as  a  measure  for  expected  inflation.
This  implies  static  expectations--the  current  inflation  is  expected  to  continue.
In the analysis  of the  model  below,  this implies  that  the inflation  argument
underlying  money  and  qutsimone,  demands  changes  whenever  the  current  price  level
changes.51
We can  now substitute  into  the  equilibrium  relations  (2)  and (4)  to
determine  the equilibrium  response  of real interest  rates and inflation  to
changes  in  government  money  and  domestic  debt  financing.  Equation  (13)  shows  the
equilibrium  relation  between  chenges  in  central  bank credit  to the  government
L,, inflation  rate r,  and real  loan  rate.  rL,
1  Ml'
(13)  dL  cg=  LM1  (c+r(l-c))  +  (M1  (1r) 
1  QM'  -~
+  r  P'QM  1  -r  QM$  - d7r
M1'  QM'  -,
:1P(1-r) E  M1--  (c+r(l-c))  141  +  r  - QM3I  d
An  increase  in  inflation  will  be  associated  with  more  monetary  financing  of  the
deficit  as  long  as  we  have  not  passed  the  maximum  point  of  the  inflation  tax
Laffer  curve.  The  first  expression  in  (13)  says  that  an  increase  in  inflation  is
associated  with  less  real  demand  for  money  and  quasimoney,  but  a  higher
nominal  flow  of  financing.  The  second  effect  is  stronger  than  the  first  as  long
as  we  are  on  the  upward  sloping  part  of  the  Laffer  curve.
We  can  analyze  the  inflation  tax-maximizing  inflation  rate  using  the
estimated  equations  of  the  model. A simulation  of the  money  and  quasimoney
demand  equations  at  different  inflation  rates  shows  the  relationship  between  the
inflation  rate  and  seignorage  revenue  shown  in  figure  16. We  see  that  maximum52
seignorage  (defined  as the  change  in the  money  base  over  neminal  GDP)  of about
2.7  percent  of GDP  is achieved  at inflation  of a little  less  than  100  percent.
This should  not be taken too seriously  since the hypothesized  maximizing
inflation  rate  lies  well  outside  of the  range  observed  in  the  sample  period  for
the  money  and  quasimoney  regressions.  It is clear,  however,  that  historically
inflation  has  been  well below  the  seignorage-maximizing  rate.
The effect of a higher real interest  rate on money creation  is
ambiguous.  This  is  because  higher  interest  rates  have  an  ambiguous  effect  on  the
demand  for  base  money  --  they  lower  demand  for  narrow  money  but  raise  demand  for
quasimoney,  and base money is a linear combination  of the two (with the
coefficients  given  by the  currency  to i; ratio  and the  reserve  ratio). Base
money  is more likely  to rise in response  to  a real  interest  rate increase  the
higher  is the  interest  rate  elasticity  of quasimoney  demand  relative  to  money
demand,  and the higher is the ratio of existing  quasimoney  to Ml.  Thus,
equilibrium  in the  money  market  could  imply  either  a  negative  or positive
relationship  between  the  real  loan  interest  rate  and  the  inflation  rate  for  given
stock  of central  bank  credit  to  the  government.
Equation (14) shows  the equilibrium  relation  in the credit  market
between  real  bank  credit  to  the  gevernment  Ldg/P,  inflation  r,  and  the  real  loan
interest  rate  r,.
Ldg2
(14)  d  E  p  L(l-r)  (1-c)  HI  - r(l-r)(l-z)  QMH  dw
+  :(1-  2 (1-c)  Hl  +  (1-r) 2 (1-z)  QH'  - 73p  ]  drL53
Figure  16
Seignorage  Revenue
as a function  of  the Inflation  rate
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An increase  in  the  real  interest  rate  increases  credit  to  the  government  because
it  reduces  private  investment  and  credit  demand  and  because  it  increase  deposits
in the banking  system." 1 Higher  inflation  reduces  credit  to the government,
because  a higher  inflation  rate  for  a given  real loan  interest  rate  implies  a
lower  real deposit  rate (from  (12)).  Thus,  quasimoney  demand  is reduced  by
higher  inflation.  Demand  deposits  are  also  reduced,  since  these  are  a function
of  nominal  interest  rates. Thus,  equilibrium  in  the  credit  market  for  a given
stock  of government  debt  implies  a positive  relationship  between  the  real  loan
rate  and inflation.
Figures 17 and 18 show the joint determination  of the real loan
interest  rate  and  inflation  in  the  money  and  credit  markets. The  case  where  the
money market equilibrium  implies a negative relationship  between the real
interest  rate  and  inflation  is shown  in  Figure  17.  The locus  of  debt  equilibria
is  always  upward  sloping.  An  increase  in  government  borrowing  shifts  up  the  locus
of debt  equilibria.  This  implies  a  higher  real  interest  rate (rL)  and  a lower
rate of inflation  (r,).  The higher  inflation  is because  the  demand  for  base
money  is increased  by higher  real  interest  rates,  which  implies  a lower  price
level  (and  rate  of inflation)  for  a given  supply  of  money  base. An increase  in
central  bank  credit  to  the  government  increases  the  money  base,  which  shifts  up
the  money  market  equilibrium  curve. Both  inflation  and the  real  interest  rate
increase  (rU  and  w2).  The  real  interest  rate  increases  because  higher  inflation
represents  a tax  on demand  and  quasimoney  deposits  for  given  real  loan  rate,  so
"1There  is  also  the  small  negative  effect  of a decrease  in  demand  deposits
in the banking system,  so technically  we must require  that this effect  be
dominated  by the  quasimoney  and  investment  effects.Figure  17
real loan
rate
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that  deposits  would  tend  to  fall  unless  there  is  an  offsetting  rise  in interest
rates.
Figure  18 shows  the  case  where  the  locus  of  money  market
equilibria  is  upward  sloping.  An increase  in  government  borrowing  now  causes  the
inflation  rate  to  increase  as  well  as the  real  loan  rate. The  higher  real  loan
rate  causes  the  demand  for  money  base  to  fall,  which  causes  inflation  to  rise  for
a given supply  of money base.  An increase  in central  bank credit  to the
government  still  causes  an  increase  in  interest  rates  and  inflation,  for  the  same
reasons  as before. Although  both  domestic  borrowing  and  money  creation  cause
real  interest  rates  and  inflation  to increase,  it is  clear  'rom  the  graph  that
the  debt  financing  has  a  much  stronger  effect  on  real  interest  rates  and  a  much
weaker  effect  un inflation.
3.  Simulation  results
We use the model to perform  counterfactual  simulations  within and
beyond the sample  period.  We first calibrate  the exogenous  variables to
reproduce  the  observed  inflation  and  real interest  rate  over the  period  1987-
89.2 This  period  is  a  mixture  of  within-sample  and  out-of-sample  observations,
since  various  regressions  end  in  1986,  1987,  or 1988. We then  consider  changes
in the  fiscal  deficit  and  its  financing  to evaluate  how  the  deficit  translates
into  changes  in inflation  and  interest  rates.1 8
12The  exogenous  variables  Othc  and  Othd  are  adjusted  to  reproduce  the  actual
equilibrium  in the money and credit  markets.  All other exogenous  variables
retain  their  actual  or estimated  values  over  1987-89.
lsSeveral  of the  regression  equations  set  out  above  have  lagged  error  terms
on the  right-hand  side. These  are  included  in  the  model  that  is  simulated  here.Figure  18
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The first  simulation,  shown  in Table  5 as differences  from the  base
cae ,  is  an increase  in  public  investment  financed  by domestic  borrowing. The
fiscal  expansion  of  1.2  percent  of  GDP  in  1987,  .8  percent  in  1988  and  .9  percent
in 1989  results  in  a real  interest  rate  increase  of 3 percent  in 1987-88  and  5
percent  in 1989.14 The rise in the real interest  rate causes  a drop in the
ratio  of private  investment  to GDP  of .5  percent  in 1987-88  and .8  percent  in
1989.  However,  this is  not  as great  as the increase  in  public  investment,  so
growth  increases  by .4  percentage  points  in 1988  and .2  percent  in 1989.
As pointed  out  above,  the  effect  of a debt-financed  fiscal  expansion
on inflation  is  ambiguous. In this  simulation,  there  is  a slight  increase  the
first  year,  a fall  in  inflation  the  second  year,  and  an  increase  the  third  year.
The  complicated  pattern  results  from  several  offsetting  factors. The  increases
in growth in 1988 and 1989 tend to lower inflation,  because  higher growth
stimulates  greater  demand  for  money,  implying  a lower  rate  of inflation  for  a
given  amount  of  money  creation. However,  the  increased  interest  rates  have  two
offsetting  effects  on  demand  for  base  money  --  a  positive  effect  on reserves  on
quasimoney  and  a  negative  effect  on  demand  for  currency  and  on  reserves  on  demand
deposits.
This  simulation  can  be interpreted  counterfactually  as  what  would  have
happened  if  the  fiscal  adjustment  described  above  had  not  taken  place. Thus,  the
difference  between this simulation  and the  actual outcome represent the
consequences  of adjustment  as compared  to  continuing  debt-financed  fiscal
"The reason  for  the  round  number  for  the  change  in the  real interest  rate
is that  the  simulation  is  actually  run  the  other  way around--by  specifying  an
increase  in  the  real  interest  rate  and  then  calculating  the  change  in inflation
and  the  deficit  consistent  with an  unchanged  level  of  monetary  financing. This
greatly  simplifies  the computation,  while the economic  interpretation  of the
simulation  remains  the  same.59
Tablo 5
CASE  OF  INCREASED  PUBLIC  INVESTMENT
FINANCED  BY DOMESTIC  BORROWING
Difference.  from Base Case
19i7  196  19"9
Ratio*  to  CDP
National  Accounts (real)
Private  Consumption  -0.01X  -0.01X  -O.11X
Private  Invostment  -0.60X  -0.1X  -0.82X
Public  Inveewont  1.21X  0.77X  0.6U
Disposable  Incom  -0.011  0.101  -0.1$X
Capital  Stock
Public  O.OOX  0.6OX  1.J1X
Private  0.0OX  -0.97S  -1.5  1
Montetry Accounts
Stocks
Money  -0.28X  0.18X  -0.65X
Quasimoney  0.37X  0.40X  0.621
Money  Base  -O.01X  0.  17  -0.086
International  Reserves  -0.02X  0.19X  -0.09X
Public  Sector  Deficit  1.21X  0.77X  0.66X
Public  Deficit  Financing Flows
Foreign  0.0OX  -0.011  OOOX
Central  Bank  0.00X  0.00  0.001
Rest  of  Financial  Systm  1.21X  0.77X  0.680
Other  Liabilities  of  Govt.  O.OOX  O.0OX  O.OOX
Stock  of  Credit  from:
Control  Bank  to  Govt.  0.0OX  0.0OX  -0.02X
Rest  of  Fin'l  System  to  Govt.  1.20X  1.69X  2.08a
Rest  of  Fin'l  System  to  Private  -0.28X  -0.46X  -0.64X
Other  Variables  Absolute  Changs
CDP  growth  0.00  0.44X  0.16X
Inflation  0.28X  -8.40X  8.76X
Interest  rates:
Loan  Rate  4.01X  -O.0aX  10.77X
Real  Lo  n Rate  8.00X  8.OOX  5.00X
Deposit  Rate  8.67X  -0.03X  9.621
Real  Deposit  Rote  2.67X  2.601  4.26X60
expansion.  We see  that  the  fiscal  adjustment  had  the  effect  of  lowering  growth,
but  increasing  private  investment  and  lowering  real  interest  rates. This  effect
on growth  is  only  meaningful  in the  medium-run,  however,  since  a debt-financed
fiscal  expansion  is  not  sustainable  indefinitely;  it  would  be  better  to  say  that
a  decrease  in  growth  took  place  now  rather  than  later. It  also  must  be  clarified
that  the  decrease  in  growth  occurs  only  because  of  decreased  public  investment;
fiscal  adjustment  through reducing  public  consumption  would have a positive
growth effect because the only effect  would have been private investment
stimulated  through  lower  real  interest  rates.
Table  6 shows  the results  of a simulation  of an increase  in public
investment  financed  by  money  creation.  An  increase  in  inflation  of  15  percentage
points  per  year is triggered  by higher  ratios  to GDP of public  investL  nt and
public  deficit  of .2  percent  in 1987  and  1.1  percent  in  1988-89. The  reason  a
lower  deficit  increase  leads  to  the  same  inflation  rate  in  the  first  year  as  that
associated  with  higher  deficits  in  the  second  two  years  is  the  portfolio  shift
effect. An increase  in inflation  causes  a one-time  shift  out of money,  which
sharply  decreases  the  amount  of  money  financing  available  in  the  first  period.
In the succeeding  periods,  the  quantity  of money  demanded  grows  in accordance
with the  new rate  of inflation,  without  any  offsetting  portfolio  shift.
The  money-financed  increase  in  public  spending  raises  the  real  interest
rate  initially,  as  predicted  by the  comparative  statics  set  out  above. This  is
because  of  the  higher  inflation  tax  on  deposits  for  a  given  real  loan  rate,  which
requires  an  increase  in  the  interest  rate  to  increase  deposits  again  and  maintain
equilibrium. The  higher  real  interest  rates  have  a slight  negative  effect  on
priva.e  investment.  However,  this  is  more  than  offset  by  the  increase  in  public
investment,  so that  by 1989  growth  is .6  percent  higher  than  in the  base  case.61
Trblo  6
CASE  OF INCREASED  PUBLIC  INVESTMENT
FINANCED  BY  MONEY  CREATION
Difference  from ease  Case
198?  18e  1989
Ratioa  to  CDP
National  Accounts  (rea  1)
Private  Consumption  -0.211  -0.18X  -0.38X
Privata  Investment  -0.a2x  -0.12X  0056X
Public  Investment  0.28X  1.14X  1.101
Disposable  Income  -0.2x  -0.20X  -0.27X
Capital  Stock
Public  O.OOX  0.26X  0.83X
Private  0.0OX  -0.26X  -1.02X
Monetary  Accounts
Stocks
Money  -1.091  -0.66X  -0.861
quas  money  0.12X  0.011  -0.12X
Money  Base  -0.47X  -0.26X  -0.20X
International  Roserves  -1.081  -1.89X  -2.64U
Public  Sector  Deficit  0.28X  1.14X  1.1OX
Public  Deficit  Financing  Flows
Foroign  O.OOX  0.0OX  0.0OX
Central  Bank  0.28X  1.14X  1.111
Rest  of  Financial  System  O.OOX  0.001  0.0OX
Other  Liabilities  of  Govt.  0.00  0.00  0.0OX
Stock  of  Credit  from:
Central  Bank  to  Govt.  -0.01  0.91X  1.56X
Rest  of  Fln'l  Systm  to  Govt.  -0018X  -0.13X  -0.22X
Rest  of  Fin  l System  to  Private  -0.16X  -O.1X  -0.291
Other  Variabloe  Absolute  Changes
CDP  growth  0.0OX  -0.06X  0.62X
Inflation  15.00X  15.00X  16.00X
Interest  rates:
Loan  Rate  19.64X  17.78X  16.62X
Real  Loan  Rate  1.94X  0.71X  -0.8ox
Deposlt  Rate  17.40S  15.67X  14.601
Real  Deposit  Rate  0.86X  OOX  -0.86X62
Tablo 7
CASE  OF  SUBSTITUTINQ  MONEY  CREATION
FOR  DEbT  FINANCING
Differences  from Base  Case
1967  1988  1989
Ratio*  to  GOP
Natlonal  Accounts (real)
Private  Consumption  -0.21X  -0.17%  -0.27%
Private  Investment  -0.28X  0.49X  0.90%
Public  Investment  0.0OX  O.00X  0.00%
Disposablo  Incoe  -0.2X  -0.21X  -0.27X
Capital  Stock
Public  0.00%  0.10%  -0.12%
Private  O.OOX  -O.O6X  0.08X
Monetary  Accounts
Stocks
Money  -1.0C%  -O.801  -0.12X
quasimonoy  0.06%  -0.41X  -0.866
Money  Bse  -0.47%  -0.26X  -0.2CX
International  Roeorvoe  -1.o0x  -1.69X  -2.62%
Public  Sector Deficit  0.00%  0.00%  .O%OX
Public  Deficit  Financing Flows
Foreign  O.  OOX  O  .OOX  O.X
Central  Sank  0.28x  1.14X  1.04X
Rost of  Financial  System  -0.28X  -1.14X  -1.04X
Other Liabilties  of  Govt.  0.0  X  O.OOX  O.OOX
Stock of  Credit  from:
Central  Bank  to  Govt.  -0.01X  0.90X  1.48X
Rest  of  Flnil  System  to  Govt.  -0.31%  -1.42X  -2.10X
Rest  of  FlnI  Systm  co Private  -O.11X  0.06X  0.18X
Othor Variables  Absolute Changes
GDP  growth  0.0OX  -0.18X  0.29X
Inflation  16.00X  16.00X  16.00X
Interest  rates:
Loan  Rate  18686X  12.80X  9.86X
Real  Loan  Rate  1.8S6  -2.73X  -4.99!
Deposit Rate  16.76%  11.81X  8.70!
Real  Depoelt Rate  0.37X  -2.98X  - .0OX63
The  growth  fuels  greater  demand  for  deposits,  so  that  the  real  interest  rate  can
actually  fall  in'1989  compared  to the  base  case.
The higher inflation  also has a small  negative  effect on private
consumption. Higher  inflation  increases  the inflation  tax on  money  balances,
decreasing  after-tax  disposable  income  of consumers.
Interpreting  the  simulation  counterfactually,  it  would  imply  that  the
fiscal  adjustment  of the  1980's  as  compared  to  continuing  money-financed  fiscal
expansion  had the  effect  of lowering  inflation,  increasing  private  consumption
and  investment,  but decreasing  growth. Again,  the  effect  on growth  could  have
been  avoided  simply  by  making  the  locus  of fiscal  adjustment  public  consumption
rather  than  public  investment.
The final  simulation  we consider  is  a substitution  of money  for  debt
financing,  leaving  the  deficit  unchanged  as shown  in  Table  7.  The  increase  in
money financing  of .2 percent in 1987 and 1.1 percent in 1988-89  is again
associated  with increased  inflation  of 15 percent  per  year.  The  effect  on the
real interest rate is ambiguous,  with offsetting  effects of an increased
inflation  tax  on deposits  and  a fall  in government  borrowing  requirements.  In
the  first  year, the fall in government  borrowing  is small,  so the increased
inflation  tax dominates,  raising  the real loan rate  by 1.3 percent.  In the
second  and  third  years,  the larger  fall in  government  borrowing  dominates,  so
that  the real  interest  rate  falls  3 and  then  5 percent.
The fall in real  interest  rates  implies  a rise  in private  investment
by .9  percent  of GDP  by 1989.  Private  consumption  again  falls  because  of the
increased  inflation  tax. Substituting  money  for  debt  finance  is favorable  for
saving  and  growth. However,  again  we must  be cautious  in interpreting  this64
result. The  efficiency  losses  associated  with inflation  are  not  captured  by the
model;  they  could  well dominate  the  results  given  here.
IV.  THE REAL EXCHANGE  RATE  AND  THE  FISCAL  DEFICIT
The  model  of  this  section  emphasizes  that  the  real  exchange  rate  is  not
just  the  outcome  of  exchange  rate  policy  by  the  government.  Rather,  it  reflects
endogenous  economic  forces  that  affect  the  demands  and  supplies  for  tradable  and
nontradable  goods.  The  fiscal  deficit  is  especially  important  among  these,  since
it  represents  net  demand  pressure  that  is  policy-induced.  This  is  particularly
clear  in  Colombia,  where  a  corner-piece  of  the  adjustment  program  since  1985  has
been  a  substantial  devaluation  of  the  peso. This  was  achieved  without  a large
acceleration  of  inflation,  which  has  to  do  with  the  substantial  fiscal  adjustment
that  accompanied  it. It  will  be  argued  in  this  section  that  changes  in  fiscal
policy  have  been  a  dominant  influence  on  the  real  exchange  rate  and  have  helped
to  offset  the  effect  of  terms  of  trade  shifts.
1. Determination  of  the  real  exchange  rate
It  will  be  helpful  first  of  all  to  set  out  the  theoretical  relationship
between  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  resource  balance.  This  paper  follows
closely  the  methodology  given  in  the  research  proposal,  which  is  presented  in
detail  in  Rodriguez  (1989).1'  The  approach  envisions  3 goods  in  the  economy:
nontradables,  importables,  and  exportables.  If  we  think  of  importables  as  the
numeraire,  then  the  relative  price  of  nontradables  is  the  real  exchange  rate,
while  the  relative  price  of  exportables  is  the  terms  of  trade.  The  real  exchange
18For  an interesting  alternative  approach  to the real  exchange  rate  in
Colombia,  see  Clavijo  (1990).65
rate  is  determined  from  the  equilibrium  condition  in  the  market  for  nontradable
goods. Assuming  no excess  capacity  or  cyclical  unemployment,  the  supply  of  such
goods  must equal  the  demand. The  demands  and  supplies  in this  market  will  be
affected  by the  resource  balance,  the  terms  of trade,  and  government  spendir.g.
The  resource  balance  will  be  shown  in  the  next  section  to  be  a  variable  exogenous
to the  real  exchange  rate,  determined  by the  excess  of investment  over saving.
a.  Theoretical  determination  of the  real  exchange  rate
For convenience,  we reproduce  here the  model  of Rodriguez,  with some
minor  modifications  and  extensions.  The  supply  of  nontradables  is  given  by the
following:
(1)  Yn  - a(em,  ex)  Y
where em, the relative  price of importables,  and ex, the  ative price  of
exportables  are  given  as follows:
p  N
(2)  em  -
EPm
(3)  ~  ~N  P  N  ____
(3)  ex  ~~*  emltt
EP  EP  P
I  m  x66
We can  thus rewrite  the  supply  of nontradables  as a  function  only  of the  real
exchange  rate  (defined  in  terms  of  importables  and  rechristened  e)  and  the  terms
of trade,  tt:
(4)  Yn  - a(e,  tt)  Y
AS shown,  the  supply  of  nontradables  is  a  positive  function  of  the  real  exchange
rate (where  appreciation  is  up)  and  a  negative  function  of the  terms  of trade.
This latter effect is because an improvement  in the terms of trade draws
resources  towards  the  exportables  sector,  in  standard  Dutch  disease  fashion.
The  demand  for  nontradables  by the  private  sector  can  also  be given  as
a (negative)  function  of the relative  price of nontradables  relative  to both
importables  and  exportables,  as  well  as total  private  spending  Gp:
(5)  Gpn  b(em, ex)  Gp
Using  (2)  and (3)  again,  we can  rewrite  this  as:
(6)  Gpn  - b(e,  tt)  Gp
so  that  demand  for  nontradables  is  a  negative  function  of  the  real  exchange  rate
(i.e.  will  go  down  with  a  real  appreciation)  and  a  positive  function  of  the  terms
of  trade. The  latter  effect  is  because  an  increase  in  the  terms  of  trade  shifts67
demand  away from the  exportables  sector  towards  the nontradables  sector,  for
given  import  prices.
Government  spending  on  nontradables  is  given  as  a fixed  fraction  (be)  of
government  consumption,  which  in turn  is  a constant  share  of  output  g:
(7)  Ggn =  b .g.Y
The condition  that demand  of nontradables  equal the supply  can be given as
follows:
(8)  b(i, tt) (G - gY) + b . gY  - a(e, tt)Y
where  G is  total  expenditure  in  the  economy.  By  definition,  G 's  equal  to  income
minus  the  resource  balance  (surplus  in  trade  of  goods  and  nonfinancial  services),
so  we can  write it  as follows:
(9)  G - (1-ts)  Y
where  to is the  ratio  of the  resource  balance  to GDP. We can then  rewrite  (8)
as:
(10)  b(i,tt)  (1-te-g)  +  b g  - a(e,  tt)68
Taking  the  total  derivative  of (10),  we can  get  an expression  for  the  change  in
e as a function  of the  changes  in the  exogenous  variables:
(b 2(1-ts-g)  -a 2) d(tt)  - b  d(ts)  +  (bg  - b) d(g)
tll)  d(e)  - al  - b1 (1  - ts - g)
The  real  exchange  rate  is  a  negative  function  of  the  terms  of trade  (for
given  import  prices). An increase  in  the  terms  of  trade  shifts  supply  away  from
nontradables  and demand towards nontradables,  so  the real exchange rate
appreciates. The real  exchange  rate  is also  a negative  function  of the  trade
surplus.  An increase  in  the  trade  surplus  decreases  spending  relative  to  income.
This lowers  demand  for  nontradables,  so  their  relative  price  falls  (there  is  a
real  depreciation).
The real exchange rate is an ambiguous function  of the level of
government  spending. An increase  in government  spending  for  a given  resource
surplus  (and  thus given level  of total  spending)  implies  a redistribution  of
spending  from  the  private  to the  public  sector.  If the  government  hss a  higher
propensity  to spend  on nontradables  than the private  sector,  then increased
government  spending  implies  a  net  increase  in  demand  for  nontradables.  This  will
result in a real appreciation. Conversely,  if the government  has a lower
propensity  to spend on nontradables  (or to say it another  way, a higher
propensity  to spene  on importables  and exportables),  increased  spending  wJll
result  in real  depreciation.69
b.  Simulation  of the  real  exchange  rate,  1975-87
The  model  discussed  above  is  estimated  for  Colombia  over  the  period  1967-
87.  Table  8 shows  the  results. We include  a lagged  dependent  variable  term  to
represent  partial adjus.ment  of the real exchange  rate to changes in the
fundamentals. All of the variables  are significant  (although  the resource
balance  is  not  quite  significant  at  the  5  percent  level)  and  the  correct  sign.
A terms  of  trade  increase  leads  to  an  appreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate  (we
now  follow  the  Colombian  convention  where  an increase  in  the  real  exchange  rate
signifies depreciation).  An  increase in the  resource surplus causes a
depreciation  of the  real  exchange  rate.
The  sign  on the  government  expenditure  variable  is  positive,  indicating
that increased  government  spending  causes  a real  depreciation. As indicated
earlier,  the  sign  is  theuretically  ambiguous. The  sign  found  here implies  that
the  government  devotes  a lower  share  of its  spending  to  nontradables  than  does
the private sector.  This confirms conventional  wisdom in Colombia that
government  spending  is  very import-intensive.
The  equation  in Table  8 is simulated  over the  sample  period  to analyze
the  deter"iinants  of real exchange  rate  movements  over that  period. We first
simulate  the  equation  using  actual  values  of the independent  variables. The
difference  between  the  simulated  and  actual  values  of the  real  exchange  rate  is
a residual  not explained  by our  model.  We then simulate  the  model  with the
independent  variables  fixed  at their  1975 levels. The  difference  between  the
first  and the  second  simulation  is the  change  in  the real  exchange  rate  sLnce
1975 that is explained  by the 3 independent  variables.  To decompose the
explained  real exchange  rate behavior  into the portlon attributable  to each
factor,  we simulate  the  model  sucessively  with  one  of  the  independent  variables70
TABLE  8
Variables
LN(EXCH  RL)  =  log  (real  exchange  rate)
LN(TTRADE)  =  log  (terms  of trade)
RSCBAL&GDP  =  resource  balance  (Z  of  GDP)
LN(EXPTOT&GDP)  =  log  (Total  public  expenditure:  to  GDP)
PRMFSUR&GDP_SP  - primary  fiscal  surplus  (?GDP)
TWOSLS  :  dependent  variable  is  LN(EXCH_RL)
Using  1967  - 1987
Exogenous  Variables
^CONST LN(EXCH  RL(-1)) LN(TTRADE)  RSCBAL&GDP(-l)
LN(EXPTOT&GDP)  PRMFSUR&GDP_SP
Variable  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
oCONST  1.45218  1.36576  1.06327  .303
LN(EXCH_RL(-1))  .612230  .267986  2.28456  .036
LN(TTRADE)  -.221399  .808159E-01  -2.73955  .015
RSCBAL&GDP  .299868E-01  .146600E-01  2.04548  .058
LN(EXPTOT&GDP)  .421882  .131091  3.21824  .005
------------------------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  . 21  R2-  .8125  (adJ)-  .7656
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - .548271E-01 Std.  Error  of  Reg.-.585380E-01
Log(likelihood)  - 32.6573  Durbin-Watson  - 1.83021
Schwarz  Criterion  - 25.0460  F (  4,  16)  - 17.3320
Akaike  Criterion - 27.6573  Significance  - .000011
taking  its actual  value and the other two fixeC  at their 1975 levels.  The
difference  between  this  simulation  and  the  one  in  which  all  variables  are  fixed
is the  portion  of the  change  in  the  real  exchange  rate  since  1975  attributable
to the  variable  factor. Because  of the  lagged  dependent  variable,  these71
simulations  will capture  not  only the  current  period  impact  of changes  in the
independent  variables,  but  also impacts  in future  periods.
Figure  19 shows  the  results  of this  decomposition.  Because  the  real
exchange  rate equation  is in logarithmic  terms,  the vertical  axis roughly
corresponds  to  the  percentage  deviation  since  1975  attributable  to  each  variable.
We see  that  the  real  exchange  rate  appreciates  strongly  through  the  early  1980's,
then  depreciates  from  1983  to  1987. The  initial  real  appreciation  is  due  mainly
to  the  increase  in  the  terms  of  trade  associated  with  the  coffee  boom  of  1976-77
(see  Figure  20 for  behavior  of the  independent  variables).
After that,  however,  the real  appreciation  is fueled  mainly  by the
expansion  of the  resource  deficit  (which  we will see  below  to be  driven  mainly
by  fiscal deficits).  The strong depreciation  of 1983-87,  conversely,  is
explained  mainly  through  the  reversion  of  the  resource  deficit  to surplus  (again
associated  with reduction  of the  fiscal  deficit).
Another  major  factor  in the  real  depreciation  that  is less  commonly
recognized  is the  expansion  of public  spending. The  strong  increase  in  public
spending  resulted  in  a  shift  in  the  composition  of  demand  towards  tradable  goods.
This  reduced  the  demand  for  nontradables  and  caused  a change  in  the log  of the
real  exchange  rate  of .24  relative  to 1975. This  structural  shift  needs  to  be
taken  into  account  in  discussions  of  what  is  a  competitive  real  exchange  rate  in
Colombia.
The residual  does not play a major role in explaining  the real
exchange  rate  except  in  a few  years. In  1979-80,  the  exchange  rate  was about  5
percent  more appreciated  than  can  be explained  by the  exogenous  variables. In
1984-85,  the  real  depreciation  is  somewhat  more  than  can  be explained,  while  in
1987  the fundamentals  would  have  predicted  more  depreciation  than  actuallyFigure  19
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occurred. This  suggests  that  there  is  some  margin  for  managir.g  the  realexchange
rate in the short run by manipulating  the rate of nominal devaluation.
Forexample,  the  large  residual  in  1985  must  reflect  a  nominal  devaluation  by the
authorities  that  went  beyond  what  was  strictly  required  by  the  fundamentals.  Of
course,  all  of these  estimates  have  to  be taken  with a  grain  of salt  given  the
high standard  errors  associated  with the  econometric  estimates.
2.  Determination  of the  resource  balance
a.  Theoretical  derivation
The  trade  surplus  is  given  as the  sum  of the  resource  balance  of the
private  sector  (saving  minus  investment)  and  the  primary  surplus  p  of  the  public
sector:
(12)  ts - S  - i (r) + p
Private  investment  is  a  negative  function  of  the  real  interest  rate  r. The  real
interest  rate is determined  by the equilbrium  condition  in  the market for
domestic  government  debt  d
(13)  8  -d  r)
The total  derivative  of (12) gives  us the change  in the trade surplus  as a
function  of  changes  in  private  saving,  the  real  interest  rate,  and  the  government
primary  surplust75
(14)  d(ts) - d(sp) - ipdr +  dp
We  will  assume  in  what  follows  that  the  derivative  of  private  saving  with  respect
tu the real interest rate and the primary surplus is zero.  (Ricardian
equivalence  does  not  hold).
The  real  interest  rate  can  be  determined  from  the  government  financing
constraint.  The  government  borrows  a  fixed  amount  f  from  abroad  as  a  percentage
of  GDP. This is  determined  exogenously,  either  as  a  government  policy  decision
or  by  international  capital  market  constraints.  The  residual  source  of  financing
is  domestic  borrowing,  which  will  be given  by:
(15)  d  -p  -f + (r-g)  dg + r*d*
where  p is the  primary  surplus,  de  and d, are  domestic  and  foreign  debt,  r  and
r*  are  domestic  and  foreign  interest  rates,  and  g  is  the  growth  rate  of  GDP. In
discrete  time,  we can  write  the  level  of government  debt  as;
*  *
(16)  dg  =  -p -f +  (r-g+l)  d (-1)  +  r d (-l)
The amount  of government  debt in (16)  must equal  the amount  demanded  by the
public in  (13).  Letting r, p, and  f vary, this implies the following
relationship  between  r,  p and  f:
(17)  dg dr - -dp -df +  dr (d (-1))76
from  which  we can  get  r  as a  function  of p ard  fs
(18)  drm.  A_tp  d
d  - d
The real interest  rate is a negative  function  of the  primary  surplus  p and  a
negative  function  of foreign  borrowing  f. Either  an increase  in  the  surplus  or
a  shift  towards foreign  borrowing  for a given surplus  tend to relieve  the
pressure  on  domestic  financial  markets  and  decrease  the  interest  rate. Since  p
and  f  enter  symmetrically  into  the  equation  for  r,  this  implies  that  a  decrease
in p exactly  offset  by an increase  in f  will have  no effect  on r.  In other
words,  an  externally-financed  fiscal  expansion  has  no  effect  on  domestic  interest
rates.
Substituting  this into (14),  we can get the resource  balance  as a
function  of the  primary  surplus  and  the  amount  of foreign  borrowing:
(19)  d (ts)  - d-  dp +d  d  df
d; - d  d  - d
The trade  surplus  is  a negative  function  of foreign  borrowing  f  and  a positive
function  of the  primary  surplus  p (if  the  coefficient  on f is less  than  one).
Note that we have the restriction  that the coefficient  on p be one plus the
coefficient  on f. This  means  that  a  decrease  in  p  matched  exactly  by  an increase77
in  f  will reduce  the  resource  balance  one  for  one. Since  an  externally-financed
fiscal  expansion'  has no effect  on the real interest  rate, as shown in the
previous  paragraph,  it  can  only  spill  into  the  resource  balance  one  for  one.
We use (19)  as  the  basis  for  our  estimated  equation. The  results  are
shown  in  Table  9. Both  variables  are  statistically  significant  and  the  correct
sign,  and  the  other  regression  statistics  are  satisfactory.  The  coefficient  on
p  minus  the  coefficient  on f  is  equal  to .86  as opposed  to  one  as predicted  by
the theory.  We can test whether  the theoretical  restriction  is violated  by
rewriting  the  regression  as shown  in  Table  10. The  coefficient  on the  external
financing  variable  now  has  the  interpretation  of the  amount  of  violation  of the
linear  restriction.  We see  that  this  coefficient  is  not  significantly  different
than zero.  Therefore,  we cannot reject the hypothesis  that this linear
combination  of coefficients  is  equal  to one.
TABLE  9
Variables
RSCBAL&GDP  =  resource  balance  (Z  of GDP)
PRMFSUR&GDP  SP  - primary  fiscal  surplus  (ZGDP)
FINEXT&GDP_2  - external  financing  (ZGDP)
REGRESS  :  dependent  variable  is  RSCBAL&GDP
Using  1970  - 1988
Variable  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
^CONST  2.19633  .507417  4.32845  .001
PRMFSUR&GDP  SP  .448078  .139534  3.21125  .005
FINEXT&GDP  2  -. 412757  .157042  -2.62832  .018
------------------------  Equation  Summary  -------------------
No.  of Observations  - 19  R2-  .6834  (adJ)-  .6438
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - 51.4009  Std.  Error  of  Reg.-  1.79236
Log(likelihood)  =  -36.4144  Durbin-Watson  - 1.73298
Schwarz  Criterion  . -40.8310  F (  2,  16)  - 17.2646
Akaike  Criterion - -39.4144  Significance  - .00010178
TABLE 10
Variables
DRSCBALSUR  - resource  balance (ZGDP)  - primary  fiscal  surplus
(ZGDP)
SSURFIN_2  - PRMFSUR&GDP  - FINEXT&GDP  2
FINEXT&GDP_2  - external  financing  (%GDP)
REGRESS s  dependent  variable  is  DRSCBALSUR
Using  1970  - 1988
Variable  Coefficient  Std  Err  T-stat  Signf
------------------------------------------------------------ _
^CONST  2.19633  .507417  4.32845  .001
SSURFIN 2  -. 551922  .139534  -3.95548  .001
FINEXT&GDP_2  .139166  ,148385  .937869  .362
------------------------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  - 19  R2=  .5028  (adi)-  .4407
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - 51.4009  Std.  Error  of  Reg.=  1.79236
Log(likelihood) . -36.4144  Durbin-Watson  - 1.73298
Schwarz  Criterion  - -40.8310  F (  2,  16)  8.09121
Alkaike  Criterion - -39.4144  Significance  - .003733
We can use this estimated  equation  to assess  the behavior  of the
resource  balance  over  the  period  1975-88.  As  we did  with  the  real  exchange  rate
equation,  we will do this by simulating  the equation  for  base period (1975)
values  and compare  this to the simulation  with actual  values  of the primary
surplus  and  public  external  financing.  The  results  are  shown  in  figure  21. The
resource  balance  went  from  a  sizeable  surplus  in  1977  to  a  large  deficit  in  1983.
then  recovered  to  yield  a surplus  again  in  1986-88. We see  from  the  graph  that
the  external  financing  effect  is the  most important  in explaining  the resource
surpluses  of the  late  seventies,  with the  exception  of the  strong  effect  of  the
primary surplus in 1978.  In the 1980s, the two effects move together.
Externally  financed  fiscal  expansion  was responsible  for  the  deterioration  ofFigure  21
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the  resource  balance  in  the  early  1980's. Beginning  in  1984,  fiscal  contraction
accompanied  by reduced  foreign  borrowing  helped  improve  the  resource  balance.
The residual  does not play a strong  role in the behavior  of the
resource  balance  except  for  1981  and  1986. In those  years,  large  movements  in
the  private  resource  balance  were a  major  factor. In 1986,  this  may be due  to
saving  out  of the  proceeds  of the  coffee  boomlet  of that  year.  It is  notable
that  the  residual  is  not  especially  large  during  the  bigger  coffee  boom  of  1976-
77.  To the  extent  that  the  coffee  boom  affected  the  resource  balance  in  those
years,  it  did so through  public  sector  finances.
3.  Joint  simulation  of the  real  exchange  rate  and  resource  balance
The  models  in  parts  1  and  2  can  be  combined  to  get  an idea  of  the  role
that  fiscal  variables  played  in  determining  the  real  exchange  rate  through  their
effect  on the  resource  balance. We use  the same  technique  as in the  previous
sections.  The  simulated  values  of  the  resource  balance,  alternately  varying  the
primary  surplus  and  public  foreign  borrowing,  are  put  into  the  real  exchange  rate
m^odel  and  simulated. The  simulated  real  exchange  rate  outcome  is compared  to
that  where  all  variables  are  fixed,  and  the  difference  represents  the  change  in
the  real  exchange  rate  attributable  to  changes  in  the  primary  surplus  and  public
foreign  borrowing,  respectively.  The  unexplained  portion  of  the  resource  balance
is  now included  under  the  residual.
Figure  22 shows  the  decomposition  of  the  real  exchange  rate  including
the indirect  effects of the government  primary surplus  and public ,oreign
borrowing.  As in  the  previous  section,  the  effects  of  changes  in  the  government
surplus  and  changes  in financing  tend  to  move  together. An externally  financed
fiscal  expansion  played  a  major  role  in the  appreciation  of the  real  exchangeFigure  22
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rate 4.n  the early 1980's,  just as the simultaneous  reduction  of the fiscal
deficit  and  foreign  borrowing  supported  the  depreciation  after  1984.7his  exerise
can  give  some  insight  into  what  caused  some  of  the  most  important  changes  in  the
real  exchange  rate. Table  11 shows  the  changes  in  the  log  of the  real  exchange
rate  associated  with  the  different  exogenous  variables  in  the  model. The  strong
appreciation  of 1977  is  almost  entirely  due  to the  sharp  increase  in the  terms
of trade.  However,  the appreciation  was exacerbated  by a reduction  in the
government  primary  surplus,  contrary  to what would  have been sound  policy  of
increasing  the  surplus  to  keep  the  economy  stable. In  histories  of  this  period,
the  attempts  of  monetary  authorities  to  sterilize  the  reserve  inflows  from  the
TMILE 11
Exchange  Ra-.°  Change  due  to change  in:
(depreciation  is increase)
1977  1978  1979  1980  1981  1982
Public  External  Borrowing  0.004  0.004 0.019  -0.018  -0.056  -0.068
Pub  Sector  Primary  Surplus  -0.011 0.026  -0.057 0.001  -0.048  -0.048
Total  Public  Expenditure  -0.004  -0.020 0.052  0.050  0.044 0.035
Terms  of Trade  -0.118  -0.008 0.020 0.009  0.043 0.033
Overall  Residual  -0.023  -0.024  -0.047  -0.039 0.006  0.011
Total  -0.153  -0.022  -0.014 0.003  -0.011  -0.038
1983  1984  1985  1986  1987
Public  External  Borrowing  -0.071  -0.024 0.009 0.078  0.02F
Pub  Sector  Primary  Surrpus  -0.028 0.007  0.049 0.084  0.038
Total  Public  Expenditure  0.045 0.052  0.016 0.015  -0.014
Terms  of Trade  0.015 0.001  0.003  -0.042 0.032
Overall  Residual  0.081 0.083  0.047  -0.026  -0.041
Total  n.041 0.120  0.124 0.109  0.03983
coffee  boom  are  often  stressed. In this  model,  such  monetary  policy  would  work
by  reducing  net  pCiblic  foreign  borrowing.  We see  in  Table  11,  however,  that  this
was  not  a  major  factor  in 1977-78  at the  height  of the  coffee  boom.
This  contrasts  with  the  policy  package  implemented  in  1986  during  the
second,  and  smaller,  coffee  boonm.  We see  that  the  terms  of trade  change  would
have implied  an appreciation.  However,  this was more than offset by the
combination  of an increased  primary  surplus  with a large  reduction  in foreign
borrowing,  so  that  a real  depreciation  was achieved.
4.  Conclusion
This reduced  form  model  for  the real  exchange  rate  and the  resource
balance  has shown that these  variables  respond  importanti,  to macroeconomic
fundamentals  such  as the  fiscal  deficit  and  its  financing  and  the  overall  level
of  public  spendirg.  This  contrasts  to  the  common  view  in  which  the  real  exchange
rate  is  determined  by the  nominal  aevaluations  chosen  by the  authorities  and  the
resource  balance  responds  mainly  to  external  developments  such  as  e  ffee  prices.
The  model  shown  here  is  consistent  with  short-run  management  of  the  real  exchange
rate  by  the  authorities,  but  in  the  long  run  the  macro  fundamentals  are  dominant.
In  particular,  the  depreciation  of  the  mid-1980's  was  achieved  mainly  through  a
reduction  in the  public  deficit  and  in public  foreign  borrowing.
An often  overlooked  factor  that  has been  highlighted  by the  model  is
the  shift  in  the  structure  of  demand  associated  with  the  long-run  rise  in  public
spending.  The  evidence indicates that public spending is  intensive in
tradeables.  so that  an increase  in public  spending  for  a given  level  of total
spending  decreases  nontradables  demand  and  depreciates  the real  exchange  rate.84
The  resource  balance  is  explained  well  by  a simple  model  of  the  public
primary  deficit  and its  financing.  A primary  deficit  will only  translate  into
a resource  deficit  to  the  extent  that  it  is  externally  financed. This  suggests
that  capital  mobility  is  not  perfect  in  Colombia.
This  model  suggests  that  desired  changes  in  the  real  exchange  rate  and
the  resource  balance  need  to  be supported  by fiscal  and  monetary  policy  in  order
to be achieved.  Experience  of other countries  indicates  that attempts  to
influence  the real  exchange  rete  through  changes  in  the  nominal  exchange  rate
without  supporting  monetary  and  fiscal  policy  will  lead  only  to  higher  inflation.
IV.  SIMULATIONS  OF TEE  FISCAL  DEFICIT,  REAL  EXCHANGE  RATE,  AND
REAL INTEREST  RATE
Thus far this paper has taken a partial  equilibrium  approach  to
determining  the  macroeconomic  consequences  of  fiEcll  deficits. It  would  also  be
useful  to  combine  the  various  models  to  see  the  effect  of  a  fiscal  deficit  on  the
macroeconomy  when  external  and  internal  balance  is  jointlv  determined.  This  is
done in this section  through  a model  that extends  the  model  of section  11 to
include  an  external  sector,  which  in  turn  is  more  detailed  than  the  reduced  form
model  of the  previous  section.
The first  step  in extending  the  model is to specify  some  behav.oral
relations  for  imports  and  e.:ports.  Most  ColombiLan  exports  are  commodities  whose
performance  is mostly determined  by world prLce movemnents  or international
agreementst  coffee,  oil,  gold,  nickel,  coal,  etc. Be  model  here  only  the  exports
of  manufacturing.  Since  Colombia  has  a  very  small  share  in  the  market  for  these
goods,  it seems reasonable  to suppose  that exporters  are price-takers. The
supply  of  exports  will  depend  on  real  income,  representing  capacity,  and  the  real85
exchange  rat.!,  representing  the  relative  price  of tradable  goods  to firms. To
ensure  the stability  of the simulation,  we constrain  the income  elasticity  of
export  supply  to be one,  a restriction  that  is  not rejected  by the  data.  The
estimated  real  exchange  rate  elasticity  is shown  in  Regression  11.
The  price  elasticity  of  export  supply  is  around  one,  a  value  that  is
within  the range  found  by other  authors  such  as Echavarria  (1980)  and Villar
(1984),  although  somewhat  less  than  that  found  by Edwards  (1985). A variable
measuring  the  degree  of import  restrictions  was  also  tried,  but  was  not  found  to
be significant.
Regression  11
AR1 :  dependent  variable  is  Log  Manufactured  Exports  Volume  - Log real  GDP
Using  1963  - 1987
Variable  I  Coefficient I  Std  Err  I  T-stat  I  Signf
…-------------------I  ……--  --  --  --- _  -- I  ---------…  --- I  ……----------I  …---
^CONST  j  -2.45596  2.28914  I -1.07287  I  0.294
Log  Real  Exch.  Rate  -1.02085  I  0.479545  |  -2.12880  |  0.044
~RHO  0.683114  j  0.146062  4.67686  0.000
------------------------  Equation  Summary  ----- _______________
No.  of  Observations  m  25  R2-  0.7599  (adj)- 0.7495
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  =  1.10478  Std.  Error  of Reg.-  0.219166
Log(likelihood) - 3.51692  Durbin-Watson  - 1.69809
Schwarz  Criterion  - 0.298042  F (  1,  23)  - 72.7893
Akaike  Criterion - 1.51692  Significance  - 0.000000
---------------  Autocorrelation  Estimation  Sumnary  ----------------
Initial  Rho(l)  - 0.00030  Final  Rho(l)  *  0.68311
Std  Error  of Rho(l)  - 0.14606  t-value  (sig)  - 4.677  (0.000)
R-Squared  based  on transformed  (differenced)  model  - 0.28040
Convergence  at iteration  586
Imports are  divided into  three  categories that  are  modelled
separately.  Consumption  imports  are  assumed  to  depend  on  the  real  exchange  rate
and  the  volume  of  private  consumption.  Intermediate  imports  depend  on the  real
exchange  rate  and the  level  of GDP.  Capital  goods  imports  depend  on the real
exchange  rate  and the  level  of private  investment. In addition,  we include  a
subjective  index  of trade  restriction  that  is  intended  to  capture  policy  shifts
from  free  to restricted  access  to imports. The  elasticities  of all  3 types  of
imports  with  respect  to  their  activity  variables  are  constrained  to  be  one;  this
restriction  is  not rejected  by the  data.
The results  are shown  in Regressions  12, 13,  and  14.  Both  the real
exchange  rate  and  the  index  of trade  liberalization  are  strongly  significant  in
the  consumption  goods  and  intermediate  goods  import  equations.  In the  equation
for capital  goods imports,  the real  exchange  rate is significant  but not the
trade  liberalization  index. This  may reflect  a  trade  regime  in  which  there  are
relatively  fewer  restrictions  on capital  goods  imports.
Regression  12
REGRESS  :  dependent  variable  is  Log  Capital  Gds.  Imports  Volume  -
Log  real  Private  Investment
Using  1970  - 1983
Variable  !  Coefficient I  Std  Err  I  T-stat  I  Signf
____________________  I--------------  I-----------  - -I  ……-----------I  …---
^CONST  |  -14.3363  i  1.78165  -8.04666  |  0.000
Log  Real  Exch.  Rate  2.00960  0.351467  5.71776  I  0.000
Log Trade  Lib. Indexl 0.252613  1  0.221240  1  1.14181  1  0.278
------------------------  Equation  Summary  -----------------  ----
No.  of  Observations  - 14  R2-  0.7529  (adJ)- 0.7080
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  - 0.200624  Std.  Error  of Reg.-  0.135050
Log(likelihood)  - 9.85251  Durbin-Watson  - 1.69553
Schwarz  Criterion  X  5.89392  F (  2,  11)  - 1'.7593
Akaike  Criterion - 6.85251  Significance  - 0.00045887
Regression 13
REGRESS  :  dependent va6iable is Log Consumption Tmports  Volume -
Log real Private Consumption
Using  1970  - 1983
Variable  I  Coefficient  |  Std Err  T-stat  |  Signf
…_______________I  ……______--  - - - -I  ……_-  --  - ---  - -- I  ……---------I  …_--  --
'CONST  -15.4536  1.68140  |  -9.19086  |  0.000
Log  Real  Exch.  Rate |  1.42393  |  0.331692  |  4.29294  |  0.0C1
Log Trade Lib. Indexl  0.647158  |  0.208792  |  3.09954  i  0.010
- ---------------------  Equation Summary ----------------------
No. of Observationis  14  R2=  0.7105  (adj)=  0.6578
Sum of Sq. Resid. =  0.178683  Std. Error of Reg.= 0.127452
Log(likelihood)  10.6633  Durbin-Watson  =  2.08740
Schwarz Criterion =  6.70467  P (  2.  11)  13.4968
Akaike Criterion  =  7.66326  Significance  0.001095
Regression  14
REGRESS  :  dependent  variable  is  Log Imports  of Interm.  Volume  - Log  real  GDP
Using  1970  - 1983
Variable  I  Coefficient I  Std  Err  T-stat  I  Signf
…-------------------I  ……--  --  --  --- _  -- I  --------- …  --- I  ……---------  -I …---
'CONST  |  -13.5363  |  1.46243  |  -9.25604  |  0.000
Log  Real  Exch.  Rate  1.30010  |  0.288494  i  4.50650  |  0.001
Log  Trade  Lib.  Indexi 0.539991  i  0.181600  |  2.97352  |  0.013
------------------------  Equation  Summary  ----------------------
No.  of Observations  14  R2=  0.7187  (adj)= 0.6675
Sum  of Sq.  Resid.  =  0.135172  Std.  Error  of Reg.=  0.110853
Log(likelihood) - 12.6167  Durbin-Watson  =  1.93907
Schwarz  Criterion  m  8.65812  F (  2,  11)  - 14.0508
Akaike  Criterion  3  9.61671  Significance  0  0.00093588
We embed  these  equations  and  the  other  behavioral  equations  from  Part
II in a complete  accounting  framework. 16 To solve the model,  we specify  a
target  inflation  rate and  assume  that  money  financing  of the  deficit  is set  at
a level  to  achieve  this  target. External  and  domestic  borrowing  by the  public
sector  ar-  specified  exogenously.  The  model  then  solves  for  the  equilibrium  real
interest  rate  and  real  exchange  rate  to  clear  the  market  for  domestic  credit  and
the  domestic  goods  market,  respectively.  We  will  use  the  model  to  perform  policy
simulations  over  the  period  1990-94,  first  solving  for  a  baseline  simulation  and
then  solving  for  changes  in  the  endogenous  variables  when  a  given  policy  changes.
For  a  given inflation rate, we  can  present the model as  two
equilibrium  relations  between  the  real  interest  rate  and  the  real  exchange  rate,
as shown  in figure  23.  The  equilbrium  for  the  goods  market  implies  an inverse
relationship  between  the  real  interest  rate  and  the  real  exchange  rate (where  a
real appreciation  is defined  as an increase  in the real exchange  rate).  An
incre 4.se in the real interest  rate decreases  aggregate  demand becaLse it
decreases  investment.  To restore  goods  market  equilibrium,  we need a real
depreciation,  which  shifts  demand  away  from  imports  towards  domestic  goods,  and
shifts  supply  away  from  domestic  goods  towards  manufacturing  exports.
The  credit  market  equilbrium,  on the  other  hand,  implies  a positive
relationship  between  the  real  exchange  rate  and  the  real  interest  rate. A real
appreciation  increases  the  demand  for  private  investment  because  it lowers  the
relative  price  of  import-intensive  capital  goods. This  increases  credit  demand,
which  must be offset  by a rise  in  the  real  interest  rate.
"'The  accounting  framework  is described  in more detail  in Easterly,  Bwa,
Kongeamut,  and  Zizek  (1989). The  model  of thls  section  is  a  more detailed  and
re-estimated  version  of the  model  of that  paper.Figure  23
real  substitutlon  of  domestic
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The first  simulation  performed  with this  model is a substitution  of
domestic  borrowing  for  external  borrowing,  with  the  deficit  remaining  unchanged.
The  ever  more restricted  availability  of external  credit  makes  this  simulation
highly  relevant  for  Colombia;  as  noted  in  the  first  section,  such  substitution
was already  beginning  to take  place  in 1987-89.  In terms  of figure  23, this
simulation  is equivalent  to a shift  upward  in the  credit  market  equilibrium,
since  higher  public  domestic  borrowing  will  require  a  higher  real  interest  rate
other  things  equal. As shown  in  Table  12,  the  combination  of  decreased  external
financing  and  increased  domestic  borrowing  results  in  a  real  depreciation  and  an
increase  in the real  interest  rate (as  predicted  by figure  23) in the initial
years  of  the  period. The  real  depreciation  is  necessary  to  redirect  net  spending
away  from  net  imports  as  the  real  counterpart  to  the  reduced  capital  inflow.  The
higher  real interest  rate decreases  private  investment. Since  domestic  debt
carries  a higher  real  interest  rate  than  external  public  debt,  the shift  from
external  to domestic  financing  worsens  public  saving.  Since the deficit  is
assumed  unchpnged,  the lower  public  saving  means that  public  investment  must
fall.
The  fall  in  public  and  nrivate  investment  lowers  growth  in  the  outer
years of the simulation. This fall in output results  in some modest real
appreciation  compared  to the  base  case  in  1993-94. The  combination  of the  fall
in  output  and  real  depreciation  slows  import  growth. The  ratio  of  exterral  de&t
to GDP falls,  but  total  public  debt remains  roughly  unchanged.
This  simulation  shows  the  dangers  of  shifting  towards  domestic  finance
when external  finance  is reduced.  The crowding  out of private investment,
adverse  fiscal  impact,  and  lower  growth  suggest  this  policy  is inferlor  to91
Teb l  12
Differencee  from  bsee  Cae.
Substituting  domestic  debt  finenc-.g for *ternal  financing
Ratios  to  CDP (unlee  otherwise  indicet  d)
1990  1991  1992  1993  1994
___  __  __  __  __  ___  -------------------------------
ODP  Growat  Rate  0.00  -0.14%  -0.29%  -0.39%  -0.41%
Invest-ent  Groath  Rate  -0.26%  -8.25%  -3.02%  0.31#  -1.09t
Privat  -2.40%  -1.15%  -0.74%  -0.99%  -0.3oS
Pubiic  -0.260  -3.25%  -3.02%  0.31%  -1.09%
CDP per  capite  Oroath  Rate  0.00t  -0.14S  -0.29%  -0.899  -0.41f
Coneumption pee capite  grosth  rete  0.18S  0.038  -0.156  -0.34S  -0.8es
Crons  Inveatment/CDP  -0.28%  -0.59  -0. 80S  -0.84%  -0.89S
Oomeatic  Savings/CDP  -O.0O5  -0.14%  -0.22%  -0.29%  -0.88%
National  Saving*/COP  -0.0%  -0.12%  -0.16%  -0.17%  ..0.18%
Private  Investment/COP  -0.271  -0.88%  -0.43%  -0.51%  -0.51S
Pri.ste  Conaumption/0OP  0.0£iS  0.14S  0.22%  0.29%  0.838
Private  Sevinge/1OP  0.01%  0.16%  0.22S  0.24%  0.26%
Private  Resource  Balance/OP  0.28S  0.65S  0.65%  0.76%  0.77%
Public  Investment/CODP  -0.01%  -0.21%  -0.37%  -0.88%  -0.38%
Public  Sevinge/COP  -0.08%  -0.28%  -0.38%  -0.41%  -0.42S
Public  Revenuce/COP  -0.02S  -0.08%  -0.04S  -0.04%  -0.04S
Public  Expenditures/0DP  0.06%  0.0S  -0.04%  0.03%  -0.01%
Public  Deficit/CDP  0.0%  0.07o  0.00oo  0.07S  0.03O
I.LT  External Financing  -0.  97  -0.  91  -0.66%  -0.61S  -0.  7S
(Eternal  Financing  *vailability)  0.01%  0.01%  0.01%  0.01S  0.01%
sT  Fxternal  Financing  0 00%  0.00%  0.00%  . 0.00%1.
Do-eatic  financing-financial  *ynte-  1.08  . 0.96s  0.85%  00.b8t6  0.78%S
From  Banco  do  Is  Republice  0.21%  0.19%  0.11%  0.03%  0.04S
From  Rest  of  Financial  System  0.82%  0.78%  0.74%  0.8S%  0.74%
Ooestic  financing-private  sector  0.03%  0.02%  0.01%  0.01%  0.01%
Residual  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
Real  ExcIhngeiRate  Oepreciation(-)  -0.67o  -0.57%  -0.14%  0.88%  0.2O5
Do"atic  Inflotion  0.00%  0.00%11  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
Exchange  Rate  Depreciation  0.87%  0.69%  0.17S  -0.39;  -0.27S
Nominal  Interest  Rate  1.92%  2.705  3.02%  3.46S  3.38%
Real Intereet Rate  1.54S  2.17S  2.4ff  2.33%  2.795
Loan Rate  2.39S  3.365  3.75%  4.291  4.20%
Real  Loen  Rate  1.91S  2.70S  3.0SS  3.52  3.475
Coverneent  Interest Rate
Stock  of  MI/COP  -0.10S  -0.1SS  -0.18S  -0.14S  -0.125
Stock  of  Qu:ai-money/CDP  0.46%  0.67S  0.78S  0.92S  0.94S
Stock  of  credit  to  private  *ector/CDP  -0.28B  -0.63S  -0.92%  -1.21S  -1.46S
Export  Crowth  Rate  0.28%  0.14%  -0.08%  -0.22%  -0.20%
Crowth  rate  manufacturing  eaports  0.76%  0.47%  -0.15%  -0.75%S  -0.67%
Exports/GDP  0.17%  0.34S  0.42%  0.39%  0.39
Iaport  Crowth  Rate  -1.02%  -1.09%  -0.68%  -0.09%  -0.22S
Croath  rate  intermediate  imports  -0.89S  -0.90S  -0.48%  0.04%  -0.11%
Growth  rate  private  cepitel  imports  -3.uis  -2.80%  -1.03%  -0.30%  0.13S
*roath  rate  private  cons  imports  -0.90%  -0.86%  -0.88%  0.19%  0.00%
Tax Ret  on  Imports  -0.00  0.00%11  0.00%  0.00%  0.00%
ImT  rtenport  -0.06%  -0.12%  -0.18%  -0.156%  -0.17%
Current  Account  Deficit  (in  USd-ill)  -48.75  -213.79  -303.62  -886.46  -388.45
Current  Account  Deficit/COP  -0.20S  -0.47%  -0.64%  -0.68%  -0.73%
Net  Internatianal  Roe.rves  (USSaill)  -568.86  -124.72  -189.24  -;76.48  -198.68
Net  Reerva  (tii  monthe  imports)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Total  Eaternai  Debt/DOP  -0.701  -1.80%  -1.92S  -2.60%  -8.18S
Public  Debt/CDP  0.82%  0.458  0.31%  0.06%  -o.2292
one  of reducing  the  deficit  by  an  amount  comparable  to  the  rednction  in  external
financing.
The second  simulation  is one  where  tariff  revenues  are increased  by
raising  the tax rate on imports  (Table  13).  As described  earlier,  this  was
actually  one  means  of improving  the  fiscal  balance  in  Colombia  during  1985-89.
In terms  of figure  23. this is equivalent  to shifting  out the goods  market
equilibrium  curve--a  tariff  increase  increases  demand  for  domestic  goods,  which
requires  a real  appreciation  to redirect  demand  towards  imports.  The fiscal
deficit  is assumed  to remain  roughly  unchanged,  so that  the  increase  in tariff
revenues  is  accompanied  by an equivalent  rise  in  public  investment.  We see  in
the  first  year  of the  simulation,  the  prediction  of figure  23 is  confirmed--the
real exchange  rate appreciates  and the real interest  rate increases.  The
increased  real  interest  rate  decreases  private  investment,  but  this  is  offset  by
the  rise  in  public  investment  financed  by the  additional  tariff  revenues. The
growth  rate  of  both  imports  and  exports  falls--the  former  because  of the  tariff
increase  (not  fully  offset  by the  real  appreciation)  and  the  latter  because  of
the  appreciation  itself. Thus,  in  the  first  year  of the  program  the  effect  of
the  tariff  increase  both crowds  out  private  investment  and  leads  to closing  of
the  economy.
However,  if the tariff  revenues  are indeed  used to finance  public
investment,  the  effect  in  the  outer  years  is  more favorable.  The  higher  public
investment  raises  growth.  which leads  to slight  real  depreciation  in 1991-94.
The  real  interest  rate  also  falls  because  of  the  increase  in  output  in  the  outer
years. This  suggests  that  the  effect  of  a  tariff  increase  is  crucially  dependent
on how the additional  resources  are  used--if  used for investment  the initial
negative  effect  can  be  mitigated  through  higher  growth. Of course,  the  higher93
Table  1U
CAll  OF  INCRASING  IWOFT  TARIFFS  IN  1990
Diffterence  from  ie  Ce,
i99o  II  10992  1993  1994
UDP  Growth Rate  0.001  0.a31  0.82t  0.341S  0.86
Inveatment  Oreth  Rate  3.87S  0.241  o.sa  0.395  0.811111
Private  -0.6 7  1.04S  0.785  0.661  0.8U1
Public  11.341  -1.011  0.671  -. 071  -0.uSt
UGP  per cait  Oroeth  Re  0.001  0.881  0.81  0.881  0.ti4t
Conau  tlin  ter  capita  groath  rate  -0.78s  0.2S1  0.24S  0.32t  0.8ii
Crose Invesatent/UF  0.471  0.471  0.5218  O.84  O.iti
Dometil  Seving/UP  0.381  0.471  0.521t  0.81  0.1571
National  Savinga/UP  0.84S  0.61S  0.671  0.701  0.721
Privete  Inv"eten/UP  -0.211  -0.1IIX  -e  Ai1  -. 01111  O.fi
Private  Conau.pticn,'UP  -0.3Sl  -0.47S  - .21  -0.5611  -0.87n
Private  Sevinga/WP  -0.021  0.061  i  J.11  Co.1S1  0.1 i
Private  Reece  galance/QOP  0.161  0.171  0.171  0.161  0.1t11t
Public  Inveatant/P  0.66111  0.68  0.87  0.86t  0.U4t
Public  Savinge/GDP  0.561  0. 6u  0.  5u  0.881  0.  54S
Public  Revenuee/UP  0.425  0.42f  0.42f  0.411  0.41S
Pubilic  Epen  iture/CDP  0.841  0.461  0.451  0.43S  0.42f
Public  Deficit/UP  0.121  0.041  0.081  0.011  0.011
ILT  External  Financing  -0.061  -0.06S  -0.0S  -0.0811J  -0.01
$Enternnl  Financing  ovallabiIity)  -0.061  -0.08S  -0.081  -0.08S  -0.0911
ST Exernal  Financing  0.01t  0.00111  0.011  0.001  0.0011
Dometic  financinC-finencial  system  0.18i  0.101  0.06i  0.08S  0.04S
Ferm  anco de  I a Repub  lic  0.181  0.1Ot  0.061  0.081  0.04S
From Reat of  Financial  System  0.0011  O.Oti  0.001  0.00  0.00
Domestic  financing-private  sector  0.001  -0.C W  0.001  0.001  0.001
Re"idual  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001  0.001
Real  Exchange Rate Deprciation(-)  4.971  -0.tiOt  -0.341  -0.281  -o0.21
Ooe_tic  Inflation  0.001  0.0011t  0.001  0.0011t  0.001
Exchange  Rate  Depreciation  -6.06S  0.72f  0.41S1  0.3Jt  0.211
Nominal  IntOret  Rate  0.671  0.0911  -0.24S  -0.4et  -0.641
Real  Intereat  Rate  0.84S  0.07S  -0.201  -0.40D  -0.535
Loan Rate  0.841  0.11S  -0.01i  -0.615  -0.791
Real  Loan Rate  0.371  0.091  -0.2*'l  -0.801  -0.686
Stck  of  eI/DP  -0.068  0.001  0.01S  0.01t  0.01O
Stck  of  Quas -money/aDP  -0.07o  -0.201  -0.261  -0.29S  -0.801
Stock  ot  credit  to  private  sector/UP  -0.161  -0.801  -.  -0.1  -0.431  .4.6S
Export  Growth Rate  -1.71S  0.321  0.251  0.181  0.16t
Orth  rate  menufecturing  export.  -8.305  0.971e  0.691  0.t41  0.561ti
Export/GODP  -1.171  -1.0911  -1.081  -1.061  -1.016S
raport  Cronth  Rate  -^.8ff  -0.801  -0.01  0.091  0.171
Oroath  rate  intrmediate  Imports  -8.99S  -0.471  -0.14S  -0.041  0.061
Oroeth  rate  private  capital  iporta  -6.541  -0.21S  0.011  0.07o  0.091
Oroeth  rate  private  on-e lorta  -4.761  -0.661  -0.271  -0.125  0.001
Tom Rate on laportso  .. 001  6.001  1.001  6.001  8.OI
aporte/UP  -L.061  -1.095  -1.061  -1.071  -1.Odf
Current  Account  Deficit  (in  USimlII)  9.8  -29.7  -4.2  -89.6  -68.2
Current  Aount  DeficIt/(DP  -0.07o  -0.141  -0.18ti  -0.161  -0.1  fi
Not  International  Rearvee  (USallII)  -66.1  -117.8  -13t2.8  -141.4  -146.4
Not Rervee  (in  monthe imports)  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00
Total  Exterfal  Debt/CP  -1.96111  -1.601f  -1.721  -1.6s  -1.661
Public  Debt/UP  -1.861  -1.371  -1.291  -1.41f  -1.28194
tariffs  lead  to  some distortion  of  resource  which  would  negatively  affect  growth,
which  is  not  captured  by this  model. And  if the  higher  tariff  revenues  are  not
used  to  finance  investment--as  they  were  not  in  1985-89--then  the  effect  on  both
openness  and  growth  will,  be unambiguously  negativ3.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The  management  of fiscal  deficits  and  their  financing  in  Colombia  has
besn generally  sound.  The first  section  showed  how episodes  of loose  fiscal
policy  have been  minor  compared  to  other  Latir.  American  countries. The  near-
crisis  of  the  early  1980's  was  addressed  in  a timely  way through  a sharp  fiscal
adjustment.  An  analysis  shows  this  adjustment  to  have  been  a  combination  of  good
luck  and  fundamental  policy  changes,  with  more  emphasis  on  the  latter.  The  means
of fiscal  adjustment  chosen  were sometimes  suboptimal  from the standpoint  of
long-run  growth,  which  will  eventually  require  some  fiscal  reform  to  reverse  some
of the  measures  implemented  during  1985-89.
The analysis  of this paper shows  a close relationship  between  the
means  of financing  of the  fiscal  deficit  and  macroeconomic  outcomes  in  Colombia.
In  Section  III,  a simulation  model  traces  how  money-financed  and  domestic  debt-
financed  fiscal  deficits  translate  into  inflation  and the  real interest  rate.
Roughly  speaking,  a debt-financed  deficit  increase  of about  1 percent  of GDP
translates  into  a real  interest  rate  increase  of 3  to 5  percent,  while  a  money-
financed  deficit  increase  of  about  1  percent  translates  into  15  percentage  points
additional  inflation.  In Section IV, we  trace the relationship  between
externally-financed  fiscal  deficits  and  the  real  exchange  rate  and  find  that  a
good  deal  of  the  changes  in  the  real  exchange  rates  over  1975-87  are  kttributable
to fiscal  policy.  In Section  V, these  models are combined  to show how the95
external  versus  domestic  debt  financing  affects  the  simultaneous  determination
of the  real  exchange  rate  and  real  interest  rate.96
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